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Article
The Omega Man or the Isolation of U.S. Antitrust Law
SPENCER WEBER WALLER
There is a classic science fiction novel and film that present a metaphor for the
isolation of United States antitrust law in the current global context. Richard
Mathiesson’s 1954 classic science fiction novel, I am Legend, and the later 1971
film released under the name of The Omega Man starring Charleton Heston, both
deal with the fate of Robert Neville, a survivor of a world-wide pandemic who
believes he is the last man on Earth.
While I am Legend and The Omega Man are obviously works of fantasy, it
nonetheless has resonance for contemporary antitrust debate and discourse. United
States antitrust law and policy diverges significantly from the rest of the global
antitrust community in important areas of scope, philosophy, doctrine, procedure,
remedies, and institutions. Much of this divergence in world view is the product of
history and path dependence that is largely unique to the United States experience.
At the same time, some of the divergence is the result of ideological choices over the
past forty years that improbably have remained in place in the United States, while
other politics, economics, values, and policy choices have come into prominence
throughout the rest of the world.
Unlike The Omega Man, there is no plague and there are no monsters. But
there are major fault lines in competition law and policy where the United States is
the outlier and in danger of becoming The Omega Man. While there are also many
issues of agreement where the United States has been a thought leader, there are a
significant number of the most salient and controversial issues in modern
competition law where the United States is choosing to go it alone or nearly so.
There are some important caveats to this tale of antitrust exceptionalism. Some
of the United States antitrust exceptionalism means more enforcement than
elsewhere in the world. In most of the areas discussed in this article, it means less
enforcement that is seen elsewhere, particularly than in the European Union and
the numerous jurisdictions whose competition law is modeled on EU principles. Nor
does going it alone, or being in the minority, mean that the United States position
necessarily is in error, but it does caution against demonizing foreign approaches
or relentlessly searching to transplant U.S. approaches into very different societies.
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This Article surveys several significant areas of antitrust law and policy where
United States law, procedure, institutions, and remedies differ significantly from the
rest of the world. The basic thesis of the Article is that the growing isolation of U.S.
antitrust law is more than just a transatlantic divide. Rather, much of the global
community understands U.S. antitrust law and policy, but has rejected its current
narrow form in favor of a broader vision of what competition law means, what legal
rules are appropriate, and how they should be enforced. Even in areas such as
mergers and cartels, outward convergence often masks critically different practices
just beneath the surface.
As a result, the debate over the future of the Chicago School is largely moot.
Examining what the rest of the world competition community actually does, rather
what it says, shows the debate is largely over. Whether measured by numbers of
jurisdiction, percentage of world gross domestic production, population, or most
other measures, the Chicago school paradigm is the outlier, The Omega Man.
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The Omega Man or the Isolation of U.S. Antitrust Law
SPENCER WEBER WALLER *
INTRODUCTION
There is a classic science fiction novel and film that presents a metaphor
for the isolation of United States antitrust law in the current global context.
Richard Matheson’s 1954 classic science fiction novel I Am Legend,1 and
the later 1971 film released under the name of The Omega Man starring
Charlton Heston,2 both deal with the fate of Robert Neville, a survivor of a
world-wide pandemic who believes he is the last man on Earth.
Humankind has been destroyed by a war and subsequent plague that
resembles vampirism. Neville lives in post-apocalyptic Los Angeles in a
heavily fortified house further protected by garlic, mirrors, and crucifixes.
For years, he confronts only mindless vampires who seek his destruction.
Neville defends himself from attacks during the night hours and uses the
daytime to scavenge for supplies, kill vampires, and search for a cure to the
plague.
He eventually discovers there are in fact rational survivors. Humans,
infected by the plague, have been turned into a different type of vampire,
largely allergic to daylight. They have formed a new nighttime society also
seeking a cure or treatment for their condition. After a series of uneasy
contacts and misunderstandings between Neville and members of the new
society, Neville’s home is attacked by members of the new society. In the
ensuing struggle, Neville kills members of the group and is eventually
captured.
*
John Paul Stevens Chair in Competition Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. Thanks
to Christopher Dempsey, Emily Eggmann, Krystyna Kudlata, and Frances Butler for their research
assistance and to Amedeo Arena, Darren Bush, Ariel Ezrachi, James Gathii, Philip Marsden, Matthew
Sag, Christopher Sagers, Maurice Stuke, as well as participants at workshops at Loyola University
Chicago; Centre for Competition Law & Policy, Oxford University; New Zealand Commerce
Commission; and the U.K. Competition and Markets Authority for their comments and feedback.
1
RICHARD MATHESON, I AM LEGEND (1954).
2
THE OMEGA MAN (Walter Seltzer Productions 1972). The Omega Man was later remade in 2007
under the name I Am Legend starring Will Smith, with important changes that make it both less interesting
and less relevant as a metaphor to themes explored in this Article. I AM LEGEND (Warner Bros. 2007).
Richard Matheson also wrote, under a pseudonym, the screenplay for a 1964 film version titled The Last
Man on Earth. THE LAST MAN ON EARTH (Associated Producers Inc. 1964). There is an additional 2007
straight to video version entitled I AM O MEGA. I AM OMEGA (The Asylum 2007). The 1954 I Am Legend
novel also has been described as an inspiration for George Romero’s classic zombie film Night of the
Living Dead. John Casteele, George Romero Invented the Modern Zombie Horror Genre, SCREENRANT
(July 22, 2017), https://screenrant.com/george-romero-death-tribute-zombies/.
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As he awaits execution, he realizes that civilization did not end, it just
evolved in unexpected ways. While he originally viewed the new struggling
civilization as monsters, they, in fact, viewed him the same way. Parents in
the new civilization used him as a sort of boogey man to warn children who
never knew any other world to avoid straying too far from home or into the
daylight. Rather than a survivor of old humanity, he is now an evil legend to
the new race born of the infection. As he spends his final moments, he
realizes that he has become “a new superstition entering the unassailable
fortress of forever. I am legend.”3
While I Am Legend and The Omega Man are obviously works of fantasy,
they nonetheless have resonance for contemporary antitrust debate and
discourse. United States antitrust law and policy diverges significantly from
the rest of the global antitrust community in important areas of scope,
philosophy, doctrine, procedure, remedies, and institutions. Much of the
divergence in worldview is the product of history and path dependence that
is largely unique to the United States experience. At the same time, some of
the divergence is the result of ideological choices over the past forty years
that improbably have remained in place in the United States, while other
politics, economics, values, and policy choices have come into prominence
throughout the rest of the world.
Unlike in The Omega Man, there is no plague,4 and there are no
monsters. But there are major fault lines in competition law and policy where
the United States is the outlier and in danger of becoming The Omega Man.
While there are also many issues of agreement where the United States has
been a thought leader, there are a significant number of the most salient and
controversial issues in modern competition law where the United States is
choosing to go it alone or nearly so.
There are some important caveats to this tale of antitrust exceptionalism.
Some of the United States antitrust exceptionalism means more enforcement
than elsewhere in the world. In most of the areas discussed in this Article, it
means less enforcement than is seen elsewhere, particularly than in the
European Union and the numerous jurisdictions whose competition law is
modeled on EU principles. Nor does going it alone, or being in the minority,
mean that the United States’ position is necessarily in error, but it does
caution against demonizing foreign approaches or relentlessly searching to
transplant U.S. approaches into the approaches of very different societies.
This Article surveys several significant areas of antitrust law and policy
where United States law, procedure, institutions, and remedies differ
3

MATHESON, supra note 1, at 170.
But see Spencer Weber Waller, The Law and Economics Virus, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 367, 369
(2009) (using “the metaphor of the virus to capture the dynamics of how the Chicago School [analysis
of antitrust regulation] has spread by penetrating a new area of the law, replicating itself, and transmitting
itself to new host bodies of law or legal jurisdictions”).
4
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significantly from the rest of the world. The basic thesis of the Article is that
the growing isolation of U.S. antitrust law is more than just a transatlantic
divide.5 Rather, much of the global community understands U.S. antitrust
law and policy, but has rejected its current narrow form in favor of a broader
vision of what competition law means, what legal rules are appropriate, and
how they should be enforced. Even in areas such as mergers and cartels,
outward convergence often masks critically different practices just beneath
the surface.
As a result, the debate over the future of the Chicago School is largely
moot. Examining what the rest of the world competition community actually
does, rather than what it says, shows the debate is largely over. Whether
measured by number of jurisdictions, percentage of world gross domestic
production, population, or most other measures, the Chicago School
paradigm is the outlier, the Omega Man.
Part I examines single firm conduct as perhaps the most significant and
largest area of substantive divergence between the United States and the rest
of the world. Part II shifts to the scope of competition law where U.S.
antitrust law simply does not capture a wide variety of conduct and tools that
form the core competition law in much of the world. Part III looks at the
widespread use of market studies and market investigations where the
United States lacks the legal infrastructure to undertake what is routine in
key jurisdictions around the globe. Part IV explores how competition law
outside the United States may include public interest standards that fall
outside the narrow focus of U.S. antitrust law and enforcement. Part V
examines similar key divergences in public enforcement, remedies, and
private enforcement. Part VI questions why the United States antitrust
agencies have largely shied away from the implications of big data and
algorithmic competition which are attracting more significant attention
abroad. Part VII changes the focus from descriptive to normative and offers
preliminary explanations as to the reasons for the growing isolation of
United States antitrust law and how both the United States and the rest of
the world can respond to this growing divide. I conclude by returning to the
question of whether the United States is indeed the Omega Man of global
competition law.
I. ABUSING DOMINANCE
One of the more significant areas of divergence between the rest of the
world and the United States relates to the treatment of unilateral conduct that
is harmful to competition. As a matter of terminology, the United States
5
For a comparative analysis on antitrust law in the United States and abroad, see DANIEL J.
GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN ANTITRUST: AN EXAMINATION OF US AND
EU COMPETITION POLICY (2015), and D. Daniel Sokol, Troubled Waters Between U.S. and European
Antitrust, 115 MICH. L. REV. 955, 955–97 (2017).
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refers to this area of antitrust law as monopolization while the EU and most
of the rest of the world refers to this as abuse of dominance. Growing
isolation of U.S. antitrust is particularly timely given the growing number of
high profile EU and member state investigations and complaints against U.S.
tech giants such as Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Facebook where the
United States took narrower, or no, enforcement action against them for the
same behavior attacked in the EU and elsewhere.
A. The Narrow Scope and Interpretation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Part of the difference stems from the language and history of each
system. The substantive language of section 2 of the Sherman Act remains
unchanged since its adoption in 1890 and prohibits monopolization,
attempted monopolization, and conspiracies to monopolize.6
While there is no single test for section 2 liability articulated by the
United States Supreme Court, certain general principles have emerged.
Liability for monopolization requires proof of both monopoly power and
some conduct that tends to exclude competition on some basis other than
competition on the merits.7
Monopoly power has been defined as the power to raise prices or
exclude competition.8 It can be proven through direct evidence of the ability
to increase prices or that competition has in fact been excluded.9
Alternatively, monopoly power can be proven indirectly through the
definition of a relevant market in which the defendant holds a substantial
market share of a durable nature.10
Monopoly power is necessary, but not sufficient, to find a violation of
section 2. The black letter law also requires proof of some conduct which
tends to eliminate competition through some act which is either unlawful or
6

15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (“The offense of monopoly under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429–32 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that for there to exist a monopoly
under section 2, there must be an intent to monopolize by the alleged harmful competitor).
8
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
9
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986).
10
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (“The existence of
such power ordinarily is inferred from the seller’s possession of a predominant share of the market.”
(internal citations omitted)); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957)
(“Determination of the relevant market is a necessary predicate to a finding of a violation of the Clayton
Act because the threatened monopoly must be one which will substantially lessen competition ‘within
the area of effective competition.’”). Cf. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER
GUIDELINES
7–11
(2010),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf (setting forth market
definition tests for merger enforcement under section 7 of the Clayton Act).
7
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11

exclusionary. Examples of such conduct include behavior which lacks any
legitimate or non-pretextual business justification; lacks economic sense
except for its exclusionary effect; violates some other portion of the antitrust
laws; or where the harm to competition substantially outweighs any
proffered pro-competitive justification.12
The Supreme Court has described monopoly power in more positive
terms in its 2004 Trinko opinion stating:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an
important element of the free-market system. The opportunity
to charge monopoly prices–at least for a short period–is what
attracts “business acumen” in the first place; it induces risk
taking that produces innovation and economic growth.13
The EU approach to the abuse of a dominant position begins with the
very different notion of a “special responsibility” of dominant firms to
refrain from further diminishing competition.14 Although the precise scope
and meaning of this special responsibility has been debated, and has evolved
since the founding of EU competition in the 1950s, it continues to be
reaffirmed in the recent decisions of the European Court of Justice and the
European Commission.15 In addition, the EU has applied from time to time
a concept of abuse of dominance “by object,” akin to a per se violation of
Article 102—something which is unknown in U.S. monopolization law.16

11

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966) (finding that defendants held a
monopoly through unlawful and exclusionary practices).
12
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 410 (2004) (holding
that Verizon’s insufficient assistance to its rivals is not a basis for an antitrust claim); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 482–86 (1992) (affirming summary judgment against the
antitrust defendant because there were factual questions regarding the validity and sufficiency of each
claimed justification); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608–11 (1985)
(affirming trial court’s finding that ski company maintained unlawful monopoly in part because it failed
to offer any business justification whatsoever for its pattern of conduct). See generally WILLIAM C.
HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3:5 (2018-19 ed.) (collecting
cases).
13
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
14
Case
AT.39740,
Google
Search
(Shopping),
¶
331
(2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39740/39740_14996_3.pdf [hereinafter EU
Google Search]; Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sveirge AB, 2011 E.C.R. I-527, 582–
83; Case C-202/07, France Télécom SA v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. I-2369, 2391–92.
15
Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. v. Comm’n, ECLI:EU:C:2016:788, ¶¶ 60, 118,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62014CC0413&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=.
16
See generally Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, Beyond the ‘More Economics-Based Approach’: A Legal
Perspective on Article 102 TFEU Case Law, 53 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 709, 713–14 (2016); Nicolas
Petit, From Formalism to Effects? – The Commission’s Communication on Enforcement Priorities in
Applying Article 82 EC, 32 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 485, 500 (2009); Louis Vogel, Une
nouvelle venue sur la scène du droit de la concurrence: la restriction par objet, CONTRATS -
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This very different approach extends beyond the EU itself into the law
of the twenty-eight member-states, the members of the European Free Trade
Area, states that are bound to apply the principles of EU competition through
preferential trade treaties, and those states which adopted similar provisions
or interpretive principles into their own competition laws. As a result, there
have been few takers for the U.S. cowboy-capitalism-deferential approach
to the actions of dominant or monopoly firms.17
B. Thresholds for Dominance Internationally
The differences between the United States and the rest of the world
begin almost at the inception of antitrust analysis involving conduct by
powerful firms. As a rule of thumb in the United States, everything else
being equal, a defendant with ninety percent or more of a well-defined
market has monopoly power, a defendant with sixty-six percent or more may
have such power, and a defendant with thirty-three percent would not.18
There is a separate provision of section 2 that also prohibits attempts to
monopolize. Proof of unlawful monopolization requires a showing of
specific intent, unlawful or exclusionary conduct, and a probability of
success.19 This provision has rarely been used successfully in recent years
as seen in the Microsoft litigation and various private cases seeking treble
damages in diverse industries.20
Most competition regimes outside the United States operate on a very
different set of premises. Most systems involve prohibitions on the abuse of
an existing dominant position rather than conduct seeking to acquire such a
position. As the European Commission in the Google Search case noted:
The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the
behavior of an undertaking in a dominant position which is
CONCURRENCE - CONSOMMATION (Mai 2015) (Fr.) [Louis Vogel, A Newcomer to the Competition Law
Scene: Restriction by Object, CONTS. - CONCURRENCE - CONSUMPTION (May 2015)].
17
Anu Bradford et al., The Global Dominance of European Competition Law Over American
Antitrust Law 16 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 731, 734 (2019) (“Our analyses reveal that the majority of
jurisdictions with competition law regimes have laws that more closely resemble the European Union’s
competition laws than the United States’ antitrust laws. Moreover, our detailed data allows us to trace
the evolution of EU and US influence over time. This analysis reveals that the European model of
competition became more emulated than United States’ model in the 1990s, and the EU’s ‘sphere of
influence’ in the domain of competition regulation has continued to increase ever since.”).
18
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
19
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 456 (1993); Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
20
In the past five years, there have been thirty-two private antitrust cases which have cited to
attempted monopolization, but only a few with any in-depth discussion of an attempted monopolization
claim. See e.g., Duty Free Ams., Inc. v. Estee Lauder Cos., 797 F.3d 1248, 1263–68 (11th Cir. 2015)
(discussing, in the rare instance, the elements and requirements of an attempted monopolization claim);
Gulf States Reorg. Grp., Inc. v. Nucor Corp., 721 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2013) (articulating the
elements a plaintiff must show to “establish a violation of § 2 for attempted monopolization”).
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such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result
of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree
of competition is weakened and which, through recourse to
methods different from those which condition normal
competition on the merits, has the effect of hindering the
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the
market or the growth of that competition.21
At the same time, the definition and thresholds for dominance differ
significantly from the United States’ approach to the finding of monopoly
power. Dominance is defined as the ability to act independently from
competition, consumers, or competitors.22 Very large market shares, absent
exceptional circumstances, are in themselves usually evidence of
dominance.23 EU and member-state cases have found a rebuttable
presumption of dominance at fifty percent market share,24 with occasional
cases finding dominance with market shares of as low as forty percent,
depending on such factors as the size of the other firms in the market, entry
barriers, and any countervailing buyer power.25
Outside the EU, a number of jurisdictions have similar presumptions of
dominance based on market shares built into their laws, regulations, or
guidelines. For example, China, Germany, South Africa, and Israel all have
presumptions of market power or dominance in the range from thirty-five to
fifty percent market share.26 Other countries such as Canada have guidelines
which generally require further investigation where market shares exceed
fifty percent and have recognized the existence of market power where the
market shares were as low as thirty-three percent.27
What emerges is a narrower set of firms subject to the strictures of
section 2 than is the case for the rest of the world. This narrower U.S. lens
21

EU Google Search, supra note 14, ¶ 333.
Id. ¶¶ 264–65; Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Comm’n, 3 CMLR 211 (1979), ¶ 38;
United Brands v. Comm’n, Case 27/76, 1 CMLR 429 (1978), ¶ 62 [hereinafter United Brands].
23
EU Google Search, supra note 14, ¶ 266; Hoffman-La Roche, supra note 22, ¶ 41.
24
EU Google Search, supra note 14, ¶ 267; Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission,
[1991] 5 C.M.L.R. 215, ¶ 60.
25
Virgin/British Airways, 2000 O.J. (L 30/1) ¶ 88; Antitrust procedures in abuse of dominance
(Article
102
TFEU
cases),
EUR.
COMMISSION,
ANTITRUST,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/procedures_102_en.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2019).
26
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [GWB] [Act Against Restraints of Competition],
June 26, 2013, Bundesgesetzblatt at 1750 2013 I, as amended by Article 1 of the law of June 1, 2017
(Ger.), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/englisch_gwb.html#p0029; Anti-monopoly
Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug.
30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 19 (China), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/200902/20/content_1471587.htm; Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 7 (S. Afr.), http://www.compcom.co.za/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/pocket-act-august-20141.pdf; Economic Competition Law, 5748-1988,
Restrictive Trade Practices § 26 (Isr.).
27
Government of Canada, Abuse of Dominance – Enforcement Guidelines at 12 (Mar. 14, 2018)
(draft for public consultation), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04345.html.
22

134

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

for controlling the abuse of unilateral conduct also is reflected in the type of
prohibited conduct itself.
C. Excessive Pricing
An important difference between section 2 and most competition law
systems outside the United States lies in the treatment of high or excessive
prices. While price increases may be evidence of the existence of monopoly
power, these cannot be the basis for a finding of the unlawful or exclusionary
conduct that is the second requirement for a section 2 violation.
One reason is textual. Section 2’s prohibition of “monopolization” rather
than “monopoly” requires something more than the possession of monopoly
power. Modern courts have rejected older cases that hinted at the possibility
of liability for no-fault monopolization.28 Section 2 thus requires some
conduct that tends to exclude competition on some basis beyond superior
skill, industry, and foresight.29
By definition, this does not include merely charging high or excessive
prices. Everything else being equal, charging high prices (without more)
tends to allow current competition to flourish and invite new entry rather
than exclude existing forms of competition. In addition, on policy grounds,
the Supreme Court in Trinko identified the possibility of monopoly profits
as an important incentive and reward for new entry and innovative new
forms of competition.30 This alone provides a profound source of divergence
with international practice, where in many key jurisdictions the unilateral
excessive pricing of dominant firms may be an abuse of a dominant position
often specifically referenced in the express text of the competition law or
regulation.
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(TFEU) prohibits excessive prices as a form of abuse of dominance. Article
102 states in relevant part:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be
prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as
it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:

28

See generally Milton Handler & Richard M. Steuer, Attempts to Monopolize and No-Fault
Monopolization, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 125 (1980) (discussing no-fault monopolization). United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), is one case that modern courts have rejected.
29
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
30
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
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(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling
prices or other unfair trading conditions . . . .31
Excessive pricing cases have been part of the Article 102 jurisprudence
since the earliest days of the EU. A price is found to be excessive where the
price poses “no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product
supplied.”32 In the seminal United Brands case, the European Court of
Justice affirmed liability for excessive pricing as an unlawful abuse of
dominance in circumstances where the dominant banana producer sold
bananas in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the BelgoLuxembourg Economic Union in excess of the prices where it sold
equivalent products in Ireland.33
United Brands is indicative of one line of excessive pricing cases in the
EU. In such cases, the European Commission and the courts approach the
case in the same manner as a price discrimination claim (also a violation of
a different sub-part of Article 102),34 utilizing a comparison between time
periods or comparable markets to determine whether prices are excessive.35
The more complex cases are so-called “pure” excessive pricing cases
where there are no readily comparable time periods or other markets to
compare prices with those of the dominant firm. Recently, in the United
Kingdom, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) has challenged
excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical industry in connection with sales to
the National Health Service.36
The first such case was brought against Pfizer and Flynn Pharma for
excessive pricing in the sale of anti-epilepsy medication.37 Pfizer had
previously manufactured the drug in the United Kingdom, but later gave
such rights to Flynn. Pfizer sold to Flynn at prices higher than historically
usual, and then Flynn would resell again at a higher than usual price. The
CMA, in finding that both Flynn and Pfizer had charged excessive pricing,
looked to the “economic value” test outlined in United Brands and found
prices to be excessive based on the excessive rate of return of both
companies.38 The Competition Appeals Tribunal reversed and remanded the
31

Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, May 9,
2009, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 01 [hereinafter TFEU].
32
United Brands, supra note 22, ¶ 250.
33
Id. ¶¶ 159–62.
34
TFEU art. 102.
35
See infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
36
Margherita Colangelo & Claudia Desogus, Antitrust Scrutiny of Excessive Prices in the
Pharmaceutical Sector: A Comparative Study of the Italian and UK Experiences, 41 WORLD
COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 225, 225 (2018); Harry First, Excessive Drug Pricing as an Antitrust
Violation, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 720–26 (2019).
37
Case CE/9742-13, Unfair Pricing in Respect to the Supply of Phenytoin Sodium Capsules in the
UK, Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) (Dec. 7, 2016).
38
Id. §§ 5.9, 5.14.
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CMA decision for further analysis and documentation of the excessive
nature of the firms’ pricing.39 Most recently, the CMA issued a preliminary
decision finding Advanz Pharma liable for excessive pricing of liothyronine
tablets.40
The European Union subsequently announced their own investigation
into Aspen Pharma for the excessive pricing of certain cancer drugs.41 The
UK Competition Markets Authority also has opened investigations into
excessive pricing in the manufacture of liothyronine tablets and
hydrocortisone tablets.42
Excessive pricing claims exist outside the EU and its member states.
Section 29a(b)(1) of the Israeli Antitrust Law states that a monopolist should
not abuse their position, and that a monopolist shall be deemed to have
abused its dominant position by establishing an unfair selling price.43 The
2017 guidelines put forth by the Israeli Antitrust Authority confirm that
setting an unfair price will be considered an abuse of a monopoly position.44
The Israeli Guidelines allow the use of tests developed in other
jurisdictions.45 These tests can include price comparisons with past prices,
prices charged by rivals for similar goods, and profit comparisons to other
firms manufacturing similar products.46
Israeli litigation regarding excessive pricing began in 2011, with a case
regarding the prices charged for cottage cheese.47 The case was certified as
a class action in 2016 with the district court confirming that section
29a(b)(1) does in fact apply in cases of excessive pricing.48 A different
39
Flynn Pharma Ltd. v. Competition & Mkts. Auth., [2018] CAT 11,
http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/1275-1276_Flynn_Judgment_CAT_11_070618.pdf.
40
Carla Canivete, CMA Provisionally Finds Advanz Pharma Breached Competition Law,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 30, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/cmaprovisionally-finds-advanz-pharma-breached-competition-law-1.
41
European Commission Press Release IP/17/1323, Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal
Investigation into Aspen Pharma’s Pricing Practices for Cancer Medicines (May 15, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_1323.
42
Press Release: Drug Company Accused of Abusing Its Position to Overcharge the NHS, GOV.UK
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/drug-company-accused-of-abusing-its-positionto-overcharge-the-nhs. A recent case in Spain found excessive pricing in the text messaging market, but
that decision was overturned. Hettie O’Brien, Spanish Court Quashes Excessive Pricing Decision,
GLOBAL COMP. REV. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1147175/spanishcourt-quashes-excessive-pricing-decision.
43
Public Statement 1/17, The Antitrust Director General’s Considerations in Enforcing the
Prohibition Against Unfairly High Prices (28/02/17) The Antitrust Authority 23,
https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/legalInfo/opinion117.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 17.
46
Id.
47
Yossi Spiegel, Antitrust Enforcement of the Prohibition of Excessive Prices: The Israeli
Experience, in EXCESSIVE PRICING AND COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 127, 132–33 (Yannis
Katsoulacos & Frédéric Jenny eds., 2018).
48
Id. The case was scheduled for trial in the summer of 2018. Id. at 133.
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Israeli district court in 2017 also certified a class action excessive pricing
suit against Dead Sea Works, a provider of potash.49 The Israeli Supreme
Court passed on the opportunity to determine whether section 29a(b)(1)
makes excessive pricing unlawful in a case brought against a governmentapproved monopoly in the production of natural gas.50 There have been
nearly thirty such cases in Israel in a wide range of food and consumer
products.51
South Africa has taken an approach to excessive pricing that blends
aspects of both the comparison and pure approaches. Section 8(a) of the
South African Competition Act of 1998 prohibits a dominant firm from
charging excessive price to the detriment of consumers or customers.52 In
Competition Commission of South Africa v. Sasol Chemical Industries
Limited, the Competition Tribunal of South Africa confirmed that section
8(a) claims include the factual determination of the actual price alleged to
be excessive, the economic value of the good or service, and lastly include
the exercise of a value judgment as to the difference between the actual price
and economic value and whether this difference is excessive to the detriment
of consumers.53 The Commission also laid out three tests it would use to
determine whether or not a price is excessive: the price-cost test (comparing
the price of the good and the cost of production), the export price comparison
(comparing the price charged of the good in the country versus others), and
the geographic markets test (looking at what the firm charges in other
markets).54
The Competition Appeal Court of South Africa decided an excessive
pricing case in 2009 involving a dominant steel firm.55 The court clarified
that the analysis for excessive pricing in South Africa included two tests: the
economic value test examining the cost of production versus the price of the
good, and the reasonableness of the price in relation to the difference
between price and cost.56
In 2017, the South African Competition Commission announced that it
would conduct excessive price investigations into numerous pharmaceutical

49

Id. at 133–34.
Id. at 135.
51
Michal S. Gal, The Case for Limiting Private Litigation of Excessive Prices, J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. at 18 (forthcoming 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3463386.
52
Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 8(a) (S. Afr.).
53
Competition Comm’n of S. Afr. v. Sasol Chem. Indus. Ltd.,2014 1 (Tribunal) at 13 para. 56, 31–
32 para.119–22 (S. Afr.).
54
Id. at 32, 33 para. 130. South Africa also has acted against excessive pricing in the telecom sector.
Renee Bonorchis, Vodacom Says Reviewing S. Africa Competition Report on Pricing, BLOOMBERG L.
(Apr. 29, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/mergers-and-antitrust/vodacom-says-reviewing-safrica-competition-report-on-pricing.
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Mittal Steel S. Afr. Ltd. v. Harmony Gold Mining Co. Ltd. 2009 1 (CAC) at 1 (S. Afr.).
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Id. at 45 para. 43.
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companies. Among those being investigated are Roche Holding AG for
their provision of breast cancer medication, Pfizer for lung cancer
medication, and Aspen for cancer medications.58
Excessive or unfair pricing also is prohibited by section 17(1) of the
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).59 In 2013,
two companies in the river sand industry were found to have unfairly high
prices based on a comparison of prices and costs as well as a comparison of
prices with other river sand markets.60 Most recently, the PRC agency
enforcing this provision found Qualcomm liable for excessive pricing of
certain intellectual property licenses and certain tying violations, with the
case eventually settling with a fine of $975 million.61
The point is not whether these cases are well founded on the law or the
facts. Rather, it is to illustrate the first of numerous aspects of cases of
unilateral conduct outside the United States that proceed on theories which
the United States has rejected.
D. Price Discrimination
The forgotten stepchild of U.S. antitrust law is the Robinson-Patman Act
which bars various forms of price discrimination. The Act’s principal
provision forbids persons engaged in commerce:
[T]o discriminate in price between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of
57
International Pharmaceutical Companies Investigated for Cancer Medicine Prices,
COMPETITION COMM’N
S.
AFR.
(June
13,
2017),
http://www.compcom.co.za/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/International-pharmaceutical-companies-investigated-for-cancer-medicineprices.pdf.
58
Id.
59
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, Presidential Order No. 68, ICAO (Aug.
30, 2007, 6:32 PM), https://www.icao.int/sustainability/Documents/Compendium_FairCompetition/
China/Anti-monopoly-Law_China.pdf; see also David S. Evans et al., Assessing Unfair Pricing Under
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law for Innovation-Intensive Industries 2 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 678, 2014), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https:
//duckduckgo.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1668&context=law_and_economics (“Article 17(1) of
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) prohibits dominant firms from ‘selling commodities at unfairly high
prices or buying commodities at unfairly low prices.’” (internal citation omitted)).
60
Adrian Emch et al., NDRC’s Antitrust Crackdown Continues and Its Scope Broadens, LEXOLOGY
(Sept.
17,
2013),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=51109180-f406-48b1-9710d6acaeb1f413.
61
See Stephen Harris, Jr., An Overview of the NDRC Decision in the Qualcomm Investigation, CPI
2 ANTITRUST CHRON. (July 2015) (summarizing the Qualcomm decision). For discussion of the AntiMonopoly Law and Qualcomm’s liability, see Minkang, Anti-Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights
Under the Anti-Monopoly Law: China’s Approaches, 10 FRONTIERS L. CHINA 488, 489 (2015), and Joe
Zhang, China’s Antitrust Crackdown Hits Qualcomm with US$975 Million Fine: What Can Other Host
States Learn From the Story?, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV. INV. TREATY NEWS (May 21, 2015),
https://www.iisd.org/itn/2015/05/21/chinas-antitrust-crackdown-hits-qualcomm-with-us975-millionfine-what-can-other-host-states-learn-from-the-story/.
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such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to
injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person who
either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination.62
The Act provides certain limited defenses for cost-justified discounts and for
meeting competition,63 and also contains anti-circumvention provisions.64
There is even a criminal provision barring knowing violations of the Act for
the purpose of “destroying competition, or eliminating a competitor.”65
Despite decades of vigorous enforcement and expansive interpretation
by the U.S. Supreme Court,66 the Robinson-Patman Act largely has become
a dead letter. Neither the Federal Trade Commission nor the Justice
Department have enforced the civil or criminal provisions in decades.
Private civil enforcement has waned with the courts interpreting the
language of the Act largely the same as the more restrictive provisions of the
Sherman Act and imposing a variety of technical hurdles.67 Numerous critics
have called for the abolition of some or all of the Robinson-Patman Act as
against competitive norms and incompatible with the general tenor of the
antitrust laws.68
In contrast, price discrimination remains part of the competition tool kit
outside the United States, particularly as a form of abuse of dominance. As
previously discussed, Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union states that any abuse by a firm with a dominant position
62

15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012).
Id. § 13(b).
64
Id. § 13(c)–(e).
65
Id. § 13a.
66
See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702–03 (1967); FTC v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 542–45 (1960).
67
See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 166 (2006) (indicating
that the Robinson-Patman Act “proscribes only price discrimination [that] threatens to injure
competition” (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Brooke Grp. Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 209–10 (1993) (comparing the “character” of
claims under the two laws). See generally I ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 504–20 (7th ed. 2012)
(collecting cases).
68
See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. IV.A (2007),
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/chapter4.pdf
(recommending
repeal);
GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 5, at 63–73; Andrew I. Gavil, Secondary Line Price Discrimination and
the Fate of Morton Salt: To Save it, Let It Go, 48 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1063 (1999) (advocating for “further
refine[ment]” of the “injury to a competitor” concept); Earl W. Kintner & Joseph P. Bauer, The RobinsonPatman Act: A Look Backwards, a View Forward, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 571, 574 (1986) (summarizing
literature and proposals for reform); John B. Kirkwood, Reforming the Robinson-Patman Act to Serve
Consumers and Control Powerful Buyers, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 358, 358 (2015) (discussing the flaws
in the Robinson-Patman Act and advocating for reform); D. Daniel Sokol, Analyzing Robinson-Patman,
83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2064, 2065–66 (2015) (critiquing Robinson-Patman Act as contrary to consumer
welfare).
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will be prohibited. Part 102(c) of the Treaty specifically lists one example
of such an abuse as “applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage.”70
This provision can apply to price discrimination claims as well as the
tying, bundling, and excessive pricing claims discussed elsewhere in this
Article.71 Three conditions must be present for a finding of unlawful price
discrimination under EU law: (1) the firm imposing the differential pricing
must have market power, (2) the firm has some ability to sort customers
based on their willingness to pay, and (3) the firm must be able to prevent or
limit the resale of the goods or services.72
In the EU, both primary line discriminatory practices and secondary line
practices are regulated under Article 102(c).73 Primary line discriminatory
practices include those that are aimed to hurt other competitors and include
the offering of rebates, selective price cuts, and tying/bundling.74 Within the
rebate setting, rebates given based on the quantity ordered were found to be
discriminatory in Michelin II,75 fidelity rebates given to entice purchasers
were found to be discriminatory in the Hoffman-La Roche case,76 and target
rebates set on the retailer meeting a high sales target were also found to be
discriminatory in Michelin I.77 In Irish Sugar, the Commission held that
selective price cuts given to certain retailers by manufacturers can amount
to price discrimination in violation of 102(c).78
Secondary line price discrimination, whereby favored customers receive
discounts or other forms of lower prices versus other customers, is also
regulated under Article 102(c).79 For example, in the Brussels National
Airport case, the Commission determined that Article 82(c) (the predecessor
to Article 102(c)) applies to cases where a firm with a dominant position
gives preference to one “undertaking” pursuing the same policy as another
69
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See infra notes 120–75 and accompanying text.
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Damien Geradin & Nicolas Petit, Price Discrimination Under EC Competition Law: The Need
for a Case-by-Case Approach 4 (Glob. Competition Law Ctr., Working Paper 07/05, 2005),
https://www.coleurope.eu/research-paper/price-discrimination-under-ec-competition-law-need-casecase-approach.
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Id. at 10, 26.
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Id. at 11.
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Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-4071; Geradin & Petit, supra note 72, at
12.
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Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461; Geradin & Petit, supra
note 72, at 12.
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Case 322/81, Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461; Geradin & Petit, supra note 72, at 14.
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Commission Decision 97/624, Irish Sugar, 1997 O.J. (L 258) 1; Geradin & Petit, supra note 72,
at 16.
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80

“undertaking.” Most recently, the European Court of Judgment stated that
unlawful secondary line price discrimination does not require proof of “an
actual, quantifiable deterioration in the competitive position.”81
Russian antimonopoly law prohibits setting different prices for the same
good and prohibits imposing discriminatory conditions for the sale of
goods.82 The Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) of Russia implements a
rule of reason approach when considering price discrimination cases.83 This
approach considers the applicable market and the firm’s power in that
market, considers the motives behind the behavior, and finally weighs the
positive effects on the policy against the negative effects.84 A Russian
plaintiff in a price discrimination case must prove: (1) that different prices
were set for the same product, (2) at the same time, (3) in the same market,
and (4) there was no procompetitive justification for the setting of such
prices.85 When looking to discriminatory condition cases, the FAS analyzes
the dominant position of the firm, the effect of the policy, and any proffered
justifications.86
Section 47 of the Singapore Competition Act states that any act
constituting an abuse of a dominant position will be prohibited.87 The Act
gives an example of such an abuse as “applying dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage.”88 The Competition Commission of Singapore
notes that such discrimination is only possible where the firm is able to
differentiate between categories of buyers.89 Further, in order for the practice
to be condemned, there must be evidence of actual harm to competition.90
Procompetitive justifications will also be considered when determining if
price discrimination is an abuse.91 Such justifications can include efficient

80
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supra note 72, at 28.
81
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(2018),
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(Nov.
30,
2016),
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https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CA2004.
88
Id.
89
COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM’N OF SINGAPORE, CCCS GUIDELINES ON THE SECTION 47
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cost recovery, expansion of demand/opening up new markets, and various
other efficiencies.92
Article 6 of Peru’s Competition Act prohibits “restrictive practices that
affect free competition.”93 Price discrimination is one example of vertical
practices that restrict such competition.94 The law in Peru also considers
price discrimination to be an abuse of dominance.95 In such abuse of
dominance cases, there must be a showing of dominance and the defendant
can proffer justifications for their price discrimination.96
The question again is not the soundness of the application of this area of
the law. Price discrimination is yet another area that illustrates the
divergence between widespread use of such provisions around the world but
not in the United States, which has rejected this area of the law as a
meaningful part of the antitrust enterprise.
E. Predatory Pricing
Predatory pricing is defined as the temporary cutting of price below
some measure of cost to eliminate or discipline one or more competitors.97
Predatory pricing is virtually a dead letter in the United States despite being
alive and well in many other jurisdictions, particularly those following an
EU style abuse of dominance model. After decades of differing standards in
the lower courts, the Supreme Court established in 1993 a daunting standard
for predatory pricing in the Brooke Group case.98 The Court held that to
establish a claim for unlawful predatory pricing the plaintiff must show both
that the defendant’s prices fell below some economically relevant measure
of cost and that the defendant was likely to recoup any losses suffered during
the period of predation.99 In the aftermath of Brooke Group, there are no
reported verdicts in favor of either the government or private plaintiffs in
U.S. predatory pricing cases.100
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Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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Id. at 222, 224; see also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S.
312, 325 (2007) (applying Brooke Group to allegations of predatory buying).
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See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting the
Supreme Court, which noted “there is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes
are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful”).
93

2020]

THE OMEGA MAN

143

In contrast, the seminal case establishing the test for predatory pricing
in the EU is Akzo Chemie BV v. Commission.101 Akzo establishes that prices
set below average variable cost (AVC) will be deemed a per se violation.102
However, where a firm sets prices above AVC but below average total cost
(ATC), a violation will only be found where it is established that the price
was set as a plan to eliminate a competitor.103 Later, in France Télécom v.
Commission and Tetra Pak, the Commission established that recoupment is
not an element of predatory pricing cases in the European Union.104 Most
recently in Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet, the European Court of
Justice upheld the standard from Akzo and emphasized that where a firm sets
price above AVC, but below ATC, a violation can be found if an intent to
harm a competitor is found.105
Article 17 of China’s Antimonopoly Law prohibiting the abuse of a
dominant position provides an example of abuse as selling products at prices
below cost without a legitimate reason.106 The Article, however, gives no
indication of what cost will be used to measure “below cost.”107 The National
Development and Reform Commission drafted regulations to define below
cost as charging a price that would cause the firm to incur a loss with the
intent to exclude competitors.108 This regulation has not yet been adopted.
In order to prove a case, the plaintiff in a PRC predatory pricing case
must show that the firm charging the low price has market power or is in a
dominant position.109 Similar to EU predatory pricing law, recoupment does
not need to be shown for a predatory pricing violation.110 The law also
indicates that a defendant in a predatory pricing case will be able to present
procompetitive justifications as a defense for their pricing policy.111
Section 8(c) of the South African Competition Act states that it is
prohibited for a dominant firm to engage in an exclusionary act.112 Section
8(d)(iv) then states that such an exclusionary act includes selling goods
101

Case C-62/86, Akzo Chemie BV v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. I-3439, I-3455.
Id. at I-3455.
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v. Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. II-827.
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REV., 2013, at 21.
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below their “marginal or average variable cost.” There have been a small
number of notable predatory pricing cases brought in South Africa, the first
being the case brought by Nationwide Airlines against South African
Airways.114 The Nationwide case established that pricing below average
variable cost raises a presumption of anticompetitive effect.115 In a second
airline case, this time brought by the South African Competition
Commission, the tribunal held that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving
anticompetitive effects of the pricing policy implemented by the
defendant.116
In the most recent case brought by the Commission against Media 24,
the Competition Tribunal dismissed a predatory pricing case under 8(d)(iv)
because the plaintiff did not establish that the price was set below average
avoidable cost, the measure of the cost that the firm could have avoided by
not engaging in predatory behavior.117 The tribunal however did find a
violation under 8(c) because the plaintiff did show pricing below average
total cost, predatory intent, and recoupment on behalf of the defendant.118
Predatory pricing claims outside the United States require a high burden
of proof in most jurisdictions.119 However, in not requiring recoupment, they
remain part of the canon of competition law in most jurisdictions outside the
United States.
F. Margin Squeezes
Closely related is the international divergence on the question of price
squeeze or margin squeeze claims. A price squeeze arises when a vertically
integrated dominant firm also acts as a supplier to competitors in some
upstream market.120 The notion of a price squeeze is that the dominant firm
sets input prices so high that no competitor can then successfully enter or
compete with the dominant firm in the downstream market.
In the past, the United States appeared to accept such claims in the
aluminum industry. Alcoa, the monopoly supplier of virgin aluminum ingot,
113
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(S. Afr.).
115
Nationwide Airlines v. S. African Airways 2001 1 at 10; MACKENZIE, supra note 114, at 11.
116
MACKENZIE, supra note 114, at 11–12; see also Comm’n v. S. African Airways 2005 1 (Tribunal)
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set prices of outside fabricators of finished aluminum products, such as pots
and pans, so high that such downstream competitors could not effectively
compete with the finished products made by Alcoa itself.121
In 2008, the United States Supreme Court reached precisely the opposite
conclusion in Linkline Communications.122 Linkline concerned allegations
that an incumbent telephone company had overcharged competing internet
access providers for access to its telephone lines.123 Relying on Trinko, the
Court held that since the defendant had no antitrust duty to provide access,
it could not incur liability for providing access at allegedly too high a
price.124 The Court further held that the only potential cause of action for the
plaintiff would be if the dominant firm engaged in predatory pricing of its
broadband services in the downstream market, including both proof of price
below some economically relevant measure of cost and the likelihood of
recoupment as set forth in Brooke Group.125
Since the EU diverges significantly from the results of both Trinko and
Brook Group, it is not surprising it also follows a different path as to price
squeeze cases, which by their nature incorporate aspects of both access and
pricing claims. For example, the European Court of Justice upheld liability
in the 2010 Deutsche Telekom (DT) margin squeeze decision.126 The court
affirmed liability where the dominant telephone firm charged excessive
prices for access to telephone lines necessary to compete with DT for selling
broadband service to consumers.127 The ECJ reached a similar result in the
2014 Telefonica decision involving the dominant Spanish telephone
provider’s pricing of phone lines to its broadband competitors.128
The UK has considered a number of margin squeeze cases and most
prominently found liability in the Genzyme decision.129 Genzyme controlled
a drug necessary for the care of a rare, but devastating, illness called Gaucher
121

United States v. Alumininum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 436–38 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally
SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THE STORY OF ALCOA: THE ENDURING QUESTIONS OF MARKET POWER,
CONDUCT, AND REMEDY IN MONOPOLIZATION CASES, ANTITRUST STORIES 121–22 (Eleanor M. Fox &
Daniel A. Crane eds., 2007) (introducing United States v. Aluminum Co. of America and emphasizing its
significance in American antitrust law).
122
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 450–51 (2009).
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Id. at 438.
124
Id. at 450–51; Id. at 439–40.
125
Id. at 451.
126
Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. I-9614–15, I-9717.
127
Id. ¶ 183; see also Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sveirge AB, 2011 E.C.R. I566, I-575–76, I-599.
128
Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica SA & Telefónica de España v. Comm’n, 2014 E.C.R. 2062, ¶¶ 9,
24,
237;
Case
T-851/14,
Slovak
Telekom
v.
Comm’n,
2018
¶¶
110–12,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=209008&pageIndex=0&doclang=en
&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=10279707; Case E-6/17, Fjarskipti hf. v. Siminn hf., 2018 ¶
73, https://eftacourt.int/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/6_17__Judgment_EN.pdf.
129
Exclusionary Behaviour by Genzyme Ltd., [2003] No. CA98/3/03, ¶ 387 (UK),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/555de4c440f0b666a200015c/genzyme.pdf.
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disease. The defendant provided both the drug and the care system for
those taking the medication.131 It later began supplying the drug to an outside
health provider, but at the same price it charged for the drug and the care
system including nursing staff.132 The Office of Fair Trading, the former UK
competition agency, found this behavior to be unlawful, stating:
A pricing policy operated by a vertically integrated dominant
undertaking may infringe . . . the Act. This might occur where
a vertically integrated undertaking which is dominant in the
upstream market operates a pricing policy which does not
allow reasonably efficient competitors in the downstream
market a margin sufficient to enable them to survive in the
long term.133
A 2009 OECD roundtable on margin squeezes states:
Margin squeeze cases are relatively common. Many
competition authorities have examined at least a few
complaints involving a potentially illegal margin squeeze.
Many of these cases arise in newly liberalised sectors –
particular [sic] telecommunications, but also in the water
sector, railways, postal services, pharmaceuticals, pay
television, gasoline, and funeral services (amongst others).134
The executive summary of the OECD roundtable also notes that almost
all margin squeeze cases arise under the general prohibition of abuse of
dominance provisions in national competition laws.135 It also specifically
mentions a German statutory provision addressing margin squeeze cases in
relation to small and medium-sized companies.136
There are a number of critiques of price squeeze claims on theoretical
and empirical grounds.137 It nonetheless remains the case that the position of
130

Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶¶ 5–8.
132
Id.
133
Id. ¶ 364; see also Office of Gas & Elec. Mkts. [OFGEM], Decision to Accept Binding
Commitments from Elec. N. W. Ltd. Over Connection Charges, at 31, 35 (May 24, 2012),
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/system/files/docs/2017/04/final-draft-17-may.pdf (accepting commitments
from regulated electrical utility to cease margin squeeze allegation regarding access to its electrical grid).
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See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], POLICY ROUNDTABLES: MARGIN
SQUEEZE 8 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/46048803.pdf (surveying practices in twentyfive jurisdictions).
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Id.
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Id.
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See, e.g., Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, The Viability of Antitrust Price-Squeeze
Claims, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 273, 297 (2009) (criticizing price squeeze claims on the grounds that they could
actually encourage price fixing and that allowing courts to predict the “correct price” in these situations
places the court in a position of a public utility regulator, and finding few circumstances in which liability
for price-squeezing is appropriate); Sidak, supra note 120, at 281 (questioning “whether price-squeeze
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the United States on such issues as excessive pricing, predatory pricing, and
access to infrastructure have led it to abandon enforcement in price and
margin squeeze cases. In contrast, much of the rest of the international
competition community brings such claims when the facts so indicate.
G. Tying and Bundling
Tying is the practice where a seller uses its market power over one good
or service to coerce a buyer into taking a second good or service it may not
want or may wish to purchase from a different seller.138 Examples include
requiring buyers to purchase machine tools and the ingredients for the
products made with the machines; contracts requiring use of a designated
anesthesia group in all hospital operating rooms; and forcing buyers to
purchase both spare parts and service from the manufacturer of the copying
equipment, rather than from an independent service provider.
In Jefferson Parish, the United States Supreme Court set forth a quasi
per se rule for tying under the Sherman and Clayton acts.139 This per se
standard for tying requires proof of four elements: (1) that the tying and tied
items entail separate products or services in the sense that there is separate
demand for each of them without the other; (2) that the availability of the
tying item has been conditioned upon purchase, rental, or license of the tied
item; (3) that the party imposing the tie has sufficient market power for the
tying item to “appreciably restrain free competition” in the tied market; and
(4) that a “not insubstantial amount of commerce” in the tied item is affected
by the tying arrangement.140
Jefferson Parrish was unanimous in its result that the plaintiff failed to
prove the third element of the per se standard for tying—showing the
defendant had market power over the tying product.141 The decision also
included a concurrence by Justice O’Connor, joined by two other Justices.
The O’Connor concurrence argued for the adoption of the full rule of reason
test for all tying claims and also argued that complementary products should

concept aids or hinders coherent analysis under section 2 of the Sherman Act”); see also Bradley Aburn,
Margin Squeezing: The Superfluous “Fancy Phrase” of New Zealand Competition Law, 18 AUCKLAND
U. L. REV. 216, 230 (2012) (noting that price squeezing could benefit consumers, as it “does not give a
dominant firm more power than it already has”); Germain Gaudin & Despoina Mantzari, Margin
Squeeze: An Above-Cost Predatory Pricing Approach, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 151, 155 (2016)
(criticizing the EU approach to price-squeeze liability as over-deterring, and finding that “because of the
so-called ‘umbrella effect,’ a dominant firm would face a de facto price floor at the retail level once the
wholesale price is set, if squeeze is too broadly defined and punished by law”).
138
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 451 (1992).
139
Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 2–3 (1984).
140
Id. at 2, 3, 15–18, 34.
141
Id. at 2, 31–32.
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not be viewed as a tie of separate products even if there was some demand
for different sources of the complementary good or services.142
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this quasi per se test in its
subsequent decision in Eastman Kodak.143 The Court also took no steps to
abandon the quasi per se rule in the more recent Independent Ink decision
dealing with the market power requirement of tying law.144
The D.C. Circuit, in its 2001 Microsoft decision, believed that a full rule
of reason test should apply to claims of technological tying and sought to
distinguish this result from the more general quasi per se rule set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in Jefferson Parish.145 Additional lower
courts have from time to time applied a rule of reason analysis on alternative
rationales, rather than applying the current prevailing quasi per se test from
Jefferson Parish.146
The EU approaches these issues very differently. Article 101 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that all
agreements that have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or
distortion of competition are prohibited.147 Article 101(d) defines such an
agreement as any agreement that: “make[s] the conclusion of contracts
subject to acceptance by the parties of supplementary obligations which . . .
have no connection with the subject of such contract[].”148
Article 102(d) also states that an unlawful abuse of dominance can
include “making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
parties of supplementary obligations which . . . have no connection with the
subject of such contract.”149 As a result, tying agreements can be both an
abuse of dominance and an illegal agreement under EU law.
In Tetra Pak, the ECJ Court illustrated how tying can be regulated under
Article 102 and that tying arrangements constitute an abuse of a dominant
position if the abuse is not objectively justified.150 The ECJ affirmed liability
for the tying of the sale of machinery for packaging of liquid and semi-liquid
food products to the sale of the cartons themselves. The court noted that
tying by a dominant firm would be unlawfully abusive without objective
justification, even if in accordance with commercial usage or if there was a
natural link between the two items.151
142

Id. at 33–34.
Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 451–53.
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Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 42 (2006).
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United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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See In re Cox Enters., Inc., 871 F.3d 1093, 1104 (10th Cir. 2017) (applying a mixture of the per
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151
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The EU Microsoft case also illustrates how the tying offense in the EU
is broader than the U.S. approach.152 Microsoft states that in the EU,
distinctness of products can be established by looking to consumer
demand.153 Distinctness can be shown through direct consumer evidence or
indirect evidence such as the presence of other firms in the market that sell
the tied product without the tying product.154 But it is important to note that
the EU Commission imposed liability, affirmed by the General Court, for
the tying of the Windows Media Player to the operating system.155 This
result is in marked distinction to the tying claims regarding internet browsers
and operating systems reversed and remanded by the D.C. Circuit and
ultimately abandoned by the Justice Department in the U.S. Microsoft
litigation.156
Microsoft also was found liable for the tying of various software
applications with its dominant network server operating system. While EU
defendants can still prevail if they offer a sufficient objective justification
including efficiencies, such justifications rarely prevail and were rejected in
the EU Microsoft decision.157 This divergence with the evolving U.S.
approach to tying is highlighted in the criticism by U.S. politicians,
enforcement officials, and commentators.158
In the merger context, the European Commission has also expressed fear
over future tying and bundling by dominant firms with a wide range of
products to the detriment of competitors with less extensive products lines
as one of the grounds for barring the General Electric/Honeywell merger in
the aviation industry.159 The United States subsequently organized a
roundtable at the OECD where it was highly critical of this and other aspects
152
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, I-3613–14, 5 C.M.L.R. 11
(2007) [hereinafter Microsoft EU].
153
Id. at II-3613, ¶ 16.
154
Id. at I-3613.
155
Id. at II-3601.
156
United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 89 (2001).
157
Microsoft EU, supra note 152, ¶¶ 690, 707.
158
GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 5, at 182–84; WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN E. LOPATKA, THE
MICROSOFT CASE: ANTITRUST, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, AND CONSUMER WELFARE 81–83 (2007); James
Kantor et al., EU Imposes Sanctions on Microsoft, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2004),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB108012031906164011?ns=prod/accounts-wsj. Then Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist condemned the Commission’s action, claiming that Europe’s economies were stagnant
because of huge debt, taxes, and crippling business regulation in Brussels. Mr. Frist expressed that the
“European Commission has taken aim at Microsoft, a company whose products and technology have
been engines of global economic growth.” Id. R. Hewitt Pate, the Justice Department antitrust chief, said
the Commission’s demand that a Windows version be offered without the media player went too far. Id.
He expressed concerns that “imposing ‘code removal’ remedies” could potentially produce unintended
consequences down the road, mentioning that “sound antitrust policy must avoid chilling innovation and
competition even by ‘dominant’ companies.” Id.
159
Commission Decision 2004/134/EC of 3 July 2001, declaring a concentration to be incompatible
with the common market and the EEA Agreement Case COMP / M.2220 – General Electric/Honeywell,
2006 O.J. (L 48) 1 (EC); Case T-210/01, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-5575.
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of the EU’s approach in GE/Honeywell. Tying and bundling concerns
remain a staple of EU conglomerate merger analysis and have led to the
imposition of behavioral remedies in several recent transactions that were
cleared unconditionally by the United States.161
A 2009 ICN survey on tying practices around the world indicates a high
degree of diversity as to the requirements of tying offenses with many
jurisdictions within the EU and elsewhere actively enforcing such
provisions.162 For example, the German Bundeskartellampt indicated that it
is not necessary for tying conduct to cause direct consumer harm. It is
sufficient that “the conduct is detrimental to competition and to an effective
market structure and thus harms consumers indirectly.”163
Article 17 of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law states that an abuse of a
dominant position can occur where a firm, without justifiable reasons,
imposes tying.164 In the PRC Tetra Pak case, the defendant was accused of
tying packing materials with its sale of paper packing equipment.165 The
State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) found that Tetra
Pak’s practices were harmful as they limited customer choice, affected sales
of competitors, and restricted competition.166
Tetra Pak offered justifications for its tying practice that were rejected
by the SAIC. It claimed that tying was necessary to ensure performance and
that tying also protected consumer health and safety. The SAIC found that
there were other high-quality packing materials that sufficiently ensured
performance of Tetra Pak’s equipment, and that Tetra Pak failed to show
that other packing materials inadequately protected consumer health and
safety.167
In Qihoo v. Tencent, the first anti-monopoly case heard by the Chinese
Supreme Court, the court laid out five criteria to be considered in a tying
case.168 These include: (1) a tied product distinct from the tying product; (2)
160
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PORTFOLIO EFFECTS IN CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
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https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/UCWG_SR_TyingBund
Disc.pdf.
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Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), art. 17 (China),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471587.htm.
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Herbert Smith Freehills LLP, China’s SAIC Fines Tetra Pak RMB667.7m for Abuse of
Dominance, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f136b8feaaf2-432e-b409-ec99dac0f990.
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a defendant with a dominant position in the tying market; (3) consumers
required to accept the tied product along with the tying; (4) that there is no
justifiable reason for the tie; and (5) a negative impact on competition.169
The court ultimately did not find illegal tying as there was a lack of
restriction on consumers shown, and because there was no evidence of a
dominant position in the tying market.170 Tying allegations involving
essential and non-essential patents were also an important part of the
Qualcomm and other intellectual property antitrust cases in the PRC.171
Chapter II, section 3(4) of the Indian Competition Act of 2002 provides
that any tie-in arrangement shall be prohibited if the agreement has “an
appreciable adverse effect on competition in India.”172 A rule of reason
analysis applies to tying arrangements in India. This involves looking to the
adverse effects on competition as well as any benefits shown from the tying
arrangement. Chapter IV, section 19 of the Competition Act provides what
should be looked at in a section 3 analysis when determining if there are
appreciable adverse effects on competition: (1) creation of barriers to new
entrants; (2) driving existing competitors out of the market; (3) foreclosure
of competition by hindering entry; (4) accrual of benefits to consumers; (5)
improvements in production or distribution of goods and services; and (6)
promotion of technical, scientific, and economic development.173
Illegal tying also was found in Consumer Online Foundation v. Tata Sky
Ltd. where television service was denied to customers unless customers also
purchased hardware from the provider.174 The Commission found that this
was an unlawful tying arrangement under Section 3(4) of the Competition
Act, and that it was likely to have an adverse effect on the market given that
the service providers controlled eighty percent of the service market.175
Tying and bundling claims illustrate the same dynamic as most types of
abuse of a dominant position. The United States has been shrinking or
eliminating the scope of such claims, which remain more available to public
and private enforcers in other jurisdictions.
H. Single Product Rebates
Single product discounts or rebates refer to a situation where a firm
grants substantial discounts (sometimes on an ever-increasing basis) where
the buyer achieves certain targets based on either aggregate purchases or
percentages of purchases of that category of products or services. Such
arrangements raise competition concerns when the discount effectively
169
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forecloses an equally efficient competitor from being able to compete in the
market for the sales to customers receiving the rebates or survive on the
remaining sales opportunities in the market.
One example would be a market when there are several substantial
purchasers buying one million widgets each per year and a small number of
fringe purchasers buying a few thousand widgets annually. The largest
widget supplier—but not necessarily the more efficient—creates a rebate
program that provides a small rebate for all sales up to 999,999 units, and a
whopping twelve percent rebate for the millionth sale and all prior sales for
the year.
Single product discounts or rebates are rarely unlawful under U.S.
antitrust law. In fact, they are often praised as a form of price competition
representing the essence of the type of competition on the merits to be
encouraged through antitrust law.176 Such discounts normally will be
analyzed under the exacting standards for predatory pricing discussed
above,177 and only found illegal where price after rebate is below some
economically relevant measure of the discounter’s costs and there is a
likelihood that the discounting firm eventually can recoup its losses.178 Other
times, such discounts will be analyzed under a more complex version of the
predatory pricing analysis that involves attributing the full discounts to the
portion of sales where the competing firms must match the discounts and
then determining whether price is below cost and whether recoupment is
likely.179 Even if the single product rebates or discounts result in a de facto
exclusive dealing arrangement, it will, at most, be subject to the general rule
of reason analysis for such contracts.180 Regardless of the standard used,
most claims have been singularly unsuccessful in recent years with courts
reluctant to impose liability for conduct viewed as closely resembling
healthy price competition.181
176
GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 5, at 117–18; 3A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ANTITRUST LAW 311–12 (4th ed. 2015); I ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW
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The EU courts have been significantly more concerned with fidelity
rebates and found numerous examples to be abuses of a dominant position.
Certain portions of the cases further discuss such rebates in terms of
unlawful price discrimination which can also be a violation of Article 102.182
The ECJ also has used reasoning that analogizes such rebates to de facto
tying and exclusive dealing.183 Professor Ariel Ezrachi summarizes the EU
approach as follows:
Fidelity rebates are objectionable when they stimulate
customers to tie themselves to the dominant undertaking and
create de facto exclusivity. Such rebates weaken the structure
of competition in the market, strengthen the market power of
the already dominant undertaking and act as a barrier to entry.
It is therefore irrelevant that the tied undertaking willingly
entered into the agreement and is benefitting in the short term
from the rebates.184
Michelin is the classic case in this regard. Michelin was the dominant
firm for replacement tires for buses and trucks.185 The ECJ condemned
Michelin’s highly opaque and unwritten year-end rebate program where
each customer was provided rebates once it achieved total year sales figures
set in excess of the prior year.186 In a later case, the General Court similarly
rejected a revised rebate plan based on Michelin’s failure to demonstrate that
the plan was objectively economically justified or that it was truly a
quantity-based discount rather than a loyalty-inducing discount.187 In several
cases, the ECJ also found that there was no need to show actual harmful
effects on competition to invalidate such rebates, or at most that the rebates
were capable of producing such effects.188
The European Commission subsequently published guidance on the
application of Article 102 in a more economically oriented manner and
focused on proof of actual effects for fidelity rebates.189 Despite this
development, two commentators still note:
182
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Although both jurisdictions now employ some version of
predatory pricing analysis in their consideration of singleproduct discounts, this superficial similarity rests on a
structure of considerable difference. US courts have generally
found loyalty discounts to be procompetitive . . . . In contrast,
EU courts appear willing to ignore the complex models of the
Commission and declare such discounting by dominant firms
as abusive without considering competitive effects. In
addition, the Commission’s approach accepts a more inclusive
cost standard for computing predatory pricing and gives less
attention to recoupment or lasting market impact than would
be expected in the United States. Some observers have seen
the FTC Intel case as an innovation because it appeared . . . to
move the United States in the direction the Commission
favors, but the pricing conduct agreed in the settlement is
difficult to interpret, and no adjudication was involved.190
The Commission Guidance and the more recent ECJ decision in Intel191
may have nudged the EU slightly back in the direction of the United States
on this issue. However, that decision is equally opaque and final resolution
is years in the future,192 leaving a persistent and substantial divergence in
both substance and outcome on the treatment of single product rebates.
Outside the United States and the EU, single product rebates tend not to
be analyzed through a predatory pricing lens. A 2016 OECD Roundtable on
fidelity rebates concluded:
Tests for below-cost pricing, including the ‘discount
attribution test’, are not a reliable way to identify the
anticompetitive effects of a fidelity rebate scheme. A
predatory pricing framework can identify cases in which firms
use a fidelity rebate scheme to put in place a strategy of
predatory foreclosure against an as-efficient competitor.
However, it fails to identify cases in which consumers are
harmed as a result of a firm excluding rivals without pricing
below cost. While a price-cost test might be a useful analytical
tool in some cases, it would be ineffective as a screening

190

GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 5, at 138.
Case C-413/14 P, Intel Corp. Inc. v. Comm’n, 2017 ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, ¶¶ 1, 150.
192
See Kevin Coates, The Court of Justice and Intel: An Overdue Ruling that was Still Over-Hasty?,
32 ANTITRUST 57, 57 (2018) (“But the Court of Justice’s September 2017 ruling did not reach a final
conclusion on the Commission’s analysis of Intel’s rebate system. . . . As a result, it now looks possible
that the case will celebrate its 20th anniversary in 2020 without a final resolution.”).
191

2020]

THE OMEGA MAN

155

device or safe-harbour in an assessment or prioritisation
guide.193
Reasonable people may differ on the best approach to single product
rebates. But few would contest the global divide in this area of dominant
firm conduct.
I.

Bundled Discounts

Bundled discounts involve situations where sellers offer substantial
discounts based on the buyers achieving a certain purchase target across a
spectrum of products or categories. A simple example cited in a leading U.S.
case involves a seller of both shampoo and conditioner providing substantial
discounts or rebates for a buyer purchasing a set quantity or percentage of
their needs for both products and the competitive effect this could have on
an equally efficient manufacturer of only one of these items.194
Unlike single product discounts, there are a number of U.S. antitrust
cases dealing with this phenomenon and relatively few decisions in the EU.
While the U.S. case law has yet to settle on a single consistent approach, the
courts (with one prominent exception) have been equally as suspicious of
such claims as in the single product rebate context. While there have been
fewer cases outside the United States, the EU and other jurisdictions have
addressed such claims more favorably both in abuse of dominance cases and
merger investigations.
There has not yet been a U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the standards of
legality for bundled discounts. The courts of appeals have utilized diverse
approaches proceeding by analogy to theories of tying, exclusive dealing,
and predatory pricing.
The principal appellate case imposing liability for bundled discounts
across product lines is LePage’s Inc. v. 3M.195 In LePage’s, the Third Circuit
affirmed liability for monopolization of the market for transparent tape.196
The plaintiff was a successful manufacturer of private label tape sold in large
office supply stores and other retailers.197 3M responded to this threat by
offering cash payments, signing bonuses, and other types of discounts if
193

DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, COMPETITION COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CODEV., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE ROUNDTABLE ON FIDELITY REBATES AT THE
125TH MEETING OF THE COMPETITION COMMITTEE OF THE OECD 3 (2016),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/M(2016)1/ANN4/FINAL/en/pdf.
194
Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
195
LePage’s Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Multistate Legal Studies, Inc.
v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l Publ’ns, Inc., 63 F.3d 1540, 1543 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating
bundled discounts of different types of Bar Exam preparation courses and materials could be unlawful
even where the bundled price exceeded the combined cost of production).
196
LePage’s Inc., 324 F.3d at 144.
197
Id.
OPERATION AND
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customers achieved certain sales targets across multiple 3M products lines
for tape, office supplies, health care, and other products.198 LePage’s, as a
manufacturer of tape only, could not match these bundled discounts
regardless of whether or not the discounts fell below some relevant
measurement of 3M’s costs.199
Most of the rest of the case law on bundled prices have used different
versions of predatory pricing analyses. One federal appellate court applying
the state antitrust laws of Colorado stated, “when sales of more than one item
are bundled, whether in a single transaction or in the form of coupons or
other concessions, compliance with the statute is determined by comparing
the selling price to the cost of all items ‘included in such transaction[].’”200
A leading Ninth Circuit case took a different approach also based on
viewing the bundled discounts as a form of predatory pricing. In Cascade
Health, the court explicitly rejected the LePage’s approach in connection
with allegations that a dominant hospital bundled acute care services with
other more specialized forms of care if insurance companies selected
Cascade Health as their exclusive provider for their insurance networks.201
In so doing, the Ninth Circuit overturned a jury verdict in favor of a smaller
hospital that only provided acute care services.
The court held:
To prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or
predatory for the purposes of a monopolization or attempted
monopolization claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act, the
plaintiff must establish that, after allocating the discount given
by the defendant on the entire bundle of products to the
competitive product or products, the defendant sold the
competitive product or products below its average variable
cost of producing them.202
The 2000 report of the Antitrust Modernization Commission was even
more negative about prospects for bundled discount claims that did not meet
the full requirements of predatory pricing claims under Brooke Group. That
report noted:

198

Id. at 145.
See also SmithKLINE Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d Cir. 1978) (concluding
proof of bundled prices being below cost is not required). But cf. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696
F.3d 254, 274 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012) (limiting the approach in LePage’s to multi-product rebates and
affirming use of predatory pricing methodology for single product discount and rebate cases); FTC v.
Church & Dwight Co., 665 F.3d 1312, 1316–18 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (enforcing FTC subpoena in bundled
discount case but noting that LePage’s has been “roundly criticized” and that “this court might someday
reach a different resolution”).
200
Parish Oil Co. v. Dillon Cos., 523 F.3d 1244, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original).
201
Cascade Health Sols. v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 891, 893, 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2008).
202
Id. at 910.
199
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Courts should adopt a three-part test to determine whether
bundled discounts or rebates violate Section 2 of the Sherman
Act. To prove a violation of Section 2, a plaintiff should be
required to show each one of the following elements (as well
as other elements of a Section 2 claim): (1) after allocating all
discounts and rebates attributable to the entire bundle of
products to the competitive product, the defendant sold the
competitive product below its incremental cost for the
competitive product; (2) the defendant is likely to recoup these
short-term losses and (3) the bundled discount or rebate
program has had or is likely to have an adverse effect on
competition.203
In contrast, there is very little EU case law on bundled discounts. The
European Commission has weighed in on the issue in its Guidance on the
Application of Article 82 (now Article 102). Here, the Commission took a
relatively conservative position partially in line with the non-LePage’s line
of cases in the United States.204
In the absence of significant case law, it is difficult to say whether the
European Court of Justice will follow this approach or revert to its more
expansive treatment in line with its jurisprudence on single product
discounts. Many of these cases involve multiple types of the same product,
such as rebate schemes involving different types of tires which disadvantage
producers of more limited product types.205 There are hints of this in the most
recent ECJ Intel decision, but that case, as previously noted, was remanded
for further proceedings and is years from final resolution.206 In addition, the
European Commission and the ECJ has expressed concerns over range
effects and bundled discounts across different product lines as part of its
reasoning in prohibiting the GE-Honeywell conglomerate merger, 207 a
decision which produced fierce criticism in the United States.208
203
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2007),
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf.
204
Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement
Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant
Undertakings,
2009
O.J.
(C
45)
¶
60,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01)&from=EN.
205
See supra notes 191–94 and accompanying text.
206
Case C-413/14, Intel Corp. Inc. v. Comm’n, 2017 ECLI:EU:C:2017:632, ¶¶ 150.
207
Commission Decision 2004/134/EC of July 3, 2001, Declaring a Concentration to Be
Incompatible with the Common Market and the EEA Agreement Case COMP / M.2220 – General
Electric/Honeywell, 2006 O.J. (L 48) 1 (EC).
208
See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement by Assistant Attorney General Charles A. James
on the EU’s Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition (July 3, 2001) (on file with author)
(noting that “[c]lear and longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that the antitrust laws protect
competition, not competitors” and that this EU decision represented a significant point of divergence
between EU and U.S. competition law); see also Charles A. James, International Antitrust in the Bush
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A 2009 survey of the ICN shows a strong diversity of practice of
jurisdictions with respect to bundled discounts.209 The goals for enforcement
in this area typically include but go beyond the promotion of consumer
welfare cited by the United States. A number of jurisdictions do not require
price-cost comparisons, do not require recoupment, and/or do not require
proof of intent.210 France has been particularly active in this area with eight
challenges to bundled discounts in the ten years preceding the report.211
J. Essential Facilities Doctrine and Refusals to Deal
One of the most striking illustrations of the retreat of the United States
from a traditional theory of monopolization comes in the area of the essential
facilities doctrine and other forms of unilateral refusals to deal. From the
earliest days of U.S. antitrust law, the courts have imposed liability under
both section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act on a firm or firms
controlling an essential facility, often in the form of infrastructure such as
bridges, electrical networks, joint newsgathering operations, and
occasionally intellectual property, where the owner/operator refused access
to a competitor and the other elements of an antitrust violation were
present.212
Although the United States Supreme Court has never specifically
endorsed liability under this rubric, the lower courts have often used the
“essential facilities doctrine” to impose liability for monopolization upon
proof of:
1)

Control by a monopolist of an essential facility or
resource serving the monopolist’s market;

Administration, DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 21, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/international-antitrustbush-administration (criticizing the so-called “portfolio effects” analysis employed by the EU as
“antithetical to the goals of antitrust law enforcement”); William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and
Range Effects: It’s a Long Way from Chicago to Brussels, DEP’T JUST. (Nov. 9, 2001),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/conglomerate-mergers-and-range-effects-its-long-way-chicagobrussels (stating the GE/Honeywell merger “triggered a firestorm of criticism, not just from the U.S.
antitrust agencies and senior administration officials, but also from the business community”).
209
INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON TYING AND BUNDLED DISCOUNTING 3–4 (2009),
https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/UCWG_SR_Tying
BundDisc.pdf (providing an analysis of thirty-five jurisdictions with “respect to tying and bundled
discounts”).
210
Id. at 15–17, 19.
211
Id. at 7.
212
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 379–80 (1973); Associated Press v. United
States, 326 U.S. 1, 4 (1945); United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of Saint Louis, 224 U.S. 383, 390–
91, 411–12 (1912); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1513, 1522,
1525 (10th Cir. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 472 U.S. 585, 611 (1985). In addition, the government’s
landmark monopolization case resulting in the breakup of the monopoly Bell System telephone network
was based in part on the essential facilities doctrine. See Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller,
Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 5–7 (2008) (explaining the history of Supreme
Court cases in the essential facilities area).
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A competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to
duplicate the essential facility;
The unjustified denial of the use of the facility to a
competitor; and
The feasibility of providing access to the facility.213

Liability on this theory was always difficult to establish factually, and
numerous cases failed because either the defendant lacked market power,
the facility controlled by the monopolist was not “essential” in any normal
sense of the term, or the excluded competitor could reasonably create or
duplicate the facility in question.214 In addition, liability was sometimes
imposed on a general refusal to deal or general monopolization theory,
blurring the lines of the acceptability of the essential facilities doctrine as a
separate theory of liability.215
The Supreme Court in the Trinko decision limited the essential facilities
doctrine in the context of regulated industries and provided dicta questioning
its overall viability.216 As commentators described the decision: “The case
primarily concerned the issue of whether it was an act of monopolization for
a regulated telephone company to fail to comply with special network
sharing obligations imposed on it by the Federal Telecommunications
Act.”217
The Court held that the alleged violations of regulatory duties by
themselves did not further provide a cause of action under section 2 of the
Sherman Act.218 The Court found no additional support for the complaint in
the plaintiff’s alternative theory based on the essential facilities theory.
The Court first stated that it had never recognized such a doctrine and
found no need in Trinko itself to either recognize or repudiate it.219 But
assuming the doctrine applied, the Court stated in dicta that the claim would
fail on the question of denied access. The Court stated:
It suffices for present purposes to note that the indispensable
requirement for invoking the doctrine is the unavailability of
access to the “essential facilities”; where access exists, the
doctrine serves no purpose. Thus, it is said that “essential
facility claims should . . . be denied where a state or federal

213

MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132–33 (7th Cir. 1983).
WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3.12
(2017–18 ed.) (collecting cases).
215
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 472 U.S.
585 (1985).
216
Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
217
HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 214, at 575.
218
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407–10.
219
Id. at 411.
214
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agency has effective power to compel sharing and to regulate
its scope and terms.”220
The continued vitality and desirability of the essential facilities doctrine
and related unilateral refusal to deal claims remain hotly debated in the
United States both before and after Trinko.221 Whatever the answer to those
questions, most courts and commentators believe that the application of such
claims to the refusal to license intellectual property rather than physical
infrastructure type facilities is either barred or limited to the most
extraordinary circumstances.222
Current U.S. policy makes the pursuit of cases based on the refusal to
license intellectual property rights highly unlikely. While one prominent
case has imposed liability for refusal to license certain IP rights, even that
court held that a monopolist’s “desire to exclude others from its [protected]

220

Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Compare RICHARD N. LANGLOIS, Technological Standards, Innovation, and Essential
Facilities: Toward a Schumpeterian Post-Chicago Approach, in DYNAMIC COMPETITION AND PUBLIC
POLICY: TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION, AND ANTITRUST ISSUES 1993 (Jerry Ellig ed., 2001), Brett M.
Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917
(2005), Brett Frischmann & Spencer Weber Waller, Revitalizing Essential Facilities, 75 ANTITRUST L.J.
1 (2008), Brett M. Frischmann & Mark Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007), Marina
Lao, Networks, Access, and “Essential Facilities”: From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft, 62 SMU L.
REV. 557 (2009), Ali A. Massadeh, The Essential Facilities Doctrine Under Scrutiny: EU and US
Perspective
(UEA
Law,
Working
Paper
No.
2011-AM-1,
2011),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1738326, Robert Pitofsky et al., The Essential
Facilities Doctrine under U.S. Antitrust Law, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 443 (2002), and Spencer Weber Waller,
Areeda, Epithets, and Essential Facilities, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 359 (2008), with Philip Areeda, Essential
Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841 (1990), Michael Boudin,
Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 GEO. L.J. 395, 397–403 (1986), and Richard J. Gilbert
& Carl Shapiro, An Economic Analysis of Unilateral Refusals to License Intellectual Property, 93 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 12,749 (1996); Keith N. Hylton, Economic Rents and Essential Facilities, 1991
BYU L. REV. 1243 (1991); Allen Kezsbom & Alan V. Goldman, No Shortcut to Antitrust Analysis: The
Twisted Journey of the “Essential Facilities” Doctrine, 1996 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1187 (1999); Abbot
B. Lipsky & Gregory Sidak, Essential Facilities, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1999); Paul D. Marquandt &
Mark J. Leddy, The Essential Facilities and Intellectual Property Rights: A Response to Pitofsky,
Patterson & Hooks, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 847 (2003); David McGowan, Regulating Competition in the
Information Age: Computer Software as an Essential Facility Under the Sherman Act, 18 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 771 (1996); Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facilities
Doctrine, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 433 (1987).
222
See Marquandt & Leddy, supra note 221, at 848 (concluding that, under U.S. law, the essential
facilities doctrine cannot “properly be applied to require licensing of an intellectual property right merely
because in the absence of such a license rival firms will be unable to compete with the product
incorporating the intellectual property”); Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 221, at 12,750–51 (discussing
the refusal to deal and essential facilities doctrine).
221
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work is a presumptively valid business justification.” Other decisions
have come closer to a rule of per se legality.224
Change is not likely to come from the current U.S. enforcement regime.
Makan Delrahim is the first head of the Antitrust Division who is also a
member of the patent bar.225 He is strongly protective of intellectual property
rights and has been on record against the use of antitrust law to weaken IP
protection for over twenty years.
As a member of the 2000 Antitrust Modernization Commission, he
issued a dissenting opinion from the final AMC report stating:
In my view, antitrust law and policy must be careful not to
constrain the legitimate exercise of intellectual property rights.
The application of antitrust laws must not illegitimately stifle
creators or innovation by condemning pro-competitive
activities that would maximize incentives for investments or
efficiency-maximizing business arrangements.
Antitrust enforcers should also strive to eliminate as much as
possible the unnecessary uncertainties for innovators and
creators in their ability to exploit their intellectual property
rights, as those uncertainties can also reduce the incentives for
innovation. Only when the holders of intellectual property
rights go beyond the legitimate exercise of these rights should
antitrust law be used to constrain their activities, and only then
in a manner that is based on sound economic policies.226
As deputy head of the Antitrust Division in the Bush Administration,
Delrahim consistently spoke out against forced licensing requirements and
the dilution of intellectual property.227 As the current head of the Division,
223

Image Tech. Servs., Ltd. v. Eastern Kodak Co., 125 F. 3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 1997) (quotations
omitted) (alteration in original); see also Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support, 36 F.3d 1147, 1187
(1st Cir.1994) (noting that the “Copyright Act does not explicitly purport to limit the Sherman Act” and
that “silence is particularly acute in cases where a monopolist harms consumers in the monopolized
market by refusing to license a copyrighted work to competitors”).
224
See In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (asserting
“in the absence of . . . proof, we will not inquire into the patentee’s motivations for asserting his statutory
right to exclude”).
225
Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks at the USC Gould School
of Law’s Center for Transnational Law and Business Conference (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-uscgould-school-laws-center; see also James Edwards, Order of the New Day: IP Rights in Dynamic
Competition, IP WATCHDOG (June 10, 2018), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/06/10/order-newday-ip-rights-dynamic-competition/id=98212/.
226
DEBORAH A. GARZA ET AL., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 403, 404–05 (2007) (separate statement of Commissioner Delrahim).
227
Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., International Antitrust and
Intellectual Property: Challenges on the Road to Convergence, Remarks at the American Bar Association
Section of Antitrust Law Conference on Antitrust & Intellectual Property (May 21, 2004),
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he has given both speeches and testimony arguing for the increased
protection of intellectual property rights and the need to protect IP creators
over the competing needs of IP implementors.228 Most recently, over
seventy-five law professors signed a letter to AAG Delrahim contending that
his views were not even an accurate statement of U.S. policy on the
complicated question of the intersection of antitrust and intellectual
property.229
The treatment of refusals to deal for both physical assets and intellectual
property is very different in the European Union, its member states, and
other jurisdictions which have considered similar situations of a dominant
firm controlling a resource necessary for competition in its own market or
an adjacent one. Early in the jurisprudence of the ECJ, the court held that
the refusal by a dominant firm to supply raw ingredients to a competitor that
prevented competition in the downstream market for the finished compound
was an abuse of dominance.230 Failures to grant access to infrastructure such
as ports, rail lines, and electrical grids were condemned in terms strikingly

https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/international-antitrust-and-intellectrual-property-challenges-roadconvergence (stressing the need for protection of intellectual property rights in the face of increasing
globalization); Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Contemporary Issues
At The Intersection Of Intellectual Property and Antitrust, Remarks at The Fair Competition & Market
Economy
2004
Shanghai
International
Forum
(Nov.
10,
2004),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/contemporary-issues-intersection-intellectual-property-and-antitrust
(noting that “the antitrust laws do not serve their proper function if they are used to constrain the
legitimate exercise of intellectual property rights or to stifle the innovation that is encouraged by a strong
intellectual property regime”); Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., The
Long And Winding Road: Convergence In The Application of Antitrust to Intellectual Property, Remarks
at The George Mason Law Review Symposium (Oct. 6, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/longand-winding-road-convergence-application-antitrust-intellectual-property (urging that “antitrust
enforcement policies must be carefully designed so they do not interfere with or discourage the legitimate
exploitation of intellectual property rights through technology licensing”).
228
See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks at the USC Gould
School of Law’s Center for Transnational Law and Business Conference (Nov. 10, 2017), supra note
225; Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Remarks at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing:
Competition,
Intellectual
Property,
and
Economic
Prosperity
(Feb.
1,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarks-usembassy-beijing; Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Keynote Address at
University of Pennsylvania Law School, The “New Madison” Approach to Antitrust and Intellectual
Property Law (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makandelrahim-delivers-keynote-address-university; Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div.,
Remarks at the National Music Publishers Association Annual Meeting (June 13, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarksnational-music-publishers.
229
Michael A. Carrier et al., 7 Former Government Officials and Professors Remind Assistant AG
Delrahim of Long-Standing U.S. Policy on Standard-Essential Patents, FOSS PATS. (May 18, 2018),
www.fosspatents.com/2018/05/77-former-government-officials-and.html.
230
Case 6/73, Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 223, 1 C.M.L.R. 309. See also
Case IV/32.279, BBI v. Boosey & Hawkes plc, 1987 O.J. (L 286/36) 42, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 67.

2020]

THE OMEGA MAN

163
231

similar to the U.S. essential facilities doctrine. As in the United States,
liability was rejected where the facility or resource controlled by the
dominant firm was not truly essential or where the resource practically could
be duplicated by the competitor.232 Many of the national competition
authorities of the EU member states have applied these principles to require
access by competitors or new entrants to more local essential infrastructure
such as transportation and burial grounds.233
The EU has extended this doctrine to require access to intellectual
property as well as physical resources. In Magill, the ECJ required Irish
television stations to license their copyrighted program schedules to a new
competitor seeking to aggregate the listings to create a multichannel
viewer’s guide.234 In IMS, this right of access was extended to require
licensing of a copyrighted data structure to a competitor in order to directly
compete with the dominant firm in the sale of health care information to
pharmaceutical companies.235 In Microsoft, the General Court applied
perhaps the most expansive version of the EU essential facilities doctrine to
require the respondent to license interoperability information for its server
operating system to competitors.236 A similarly expansive view was shown
in an English Court of Appeals decision that the failure to license certain
patents could constitute an unlawful abuse of dominance under Article
102.237
Other jurisdictions have adopted some version of the essential facilities
doctrine for both physical resources as well as intellectual property rights.
Within the EU, the UK, Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria, Cyrus,
Estonia, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, and Lithuania have all applied versions
of the doctrine to impose liability and/or require access or interconnection.238
Elsewhere countries as diverse as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Israel, Japan, Guatemala, Mexico, New Zealand, the People’s
Republic of China, Peru, Turkey, Russia, and South Africa have used
231
Case AT.39813, Baltic Rail, [2018] 4 C.M.L.R. 16; Case IV/34.689, Sea Containers Ltd./Stena
Sealink, 1994 O.J. (L 15) 8.
232
Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791,
[1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112; Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke SA v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. II-923, [1997] 5
C.M.L.R. 309.
233
See Spencer Weber Waller & William Tasch, Harmonizing Essential Facilities, 76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 741, 745 (2010) (describing this phenomenon).
234
Joined Cases C-241/91P & 242/91P, RTE & ITP v. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.J. I-743, [1997] 4
C.M.L.R. 718.
235
Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, 2000 E.C.R.
I-5039, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28.
236
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 11.
237
Cases A3/2002/1380 & A3/2002/1381, Intel Corp. v. Via Techs. Inc., [2002] EWCA Civ. 1905.
238
Amadeo Arena, The Italian Council of State Rules on the Issue of Dominant Firms’ Duty to
Supply Essential Information Beyond the Requirements of Sector Regulation (BCS), E-COMPETITIONS,
N° 51786 (Jan. 29, 2013); Waller & Tasch, Harmonizing Essential Facilities, supra note 233, at 747–53.

164

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1

statutes, regulations, case law, and guidelines to penalize unilateral refusals
to deal and require access and interconnection.239 For example, Pakistan has
explicitly referred to the U.S. essential facilities doctrine in requiring access
to a stock exchange.240
The litigation over the Microsoft browser wars also produced decisions
outside the United States and the EU requiring the granting of access to
intellectual property rights. In Korea, the Korean Fair Trade Commission
(KFTC) imposed a fine and (1) ordered Microsoft to sell in Korea a version
of its Windows operating system that includes neither Windows Media
Player nor Windows Messenger functionality; (2) required that Microsoft
facilitate consumer downloads of third party media player and messenger
products selected by the Commission; and (3) prohibited Microsoft from
selling in Korea a version of its server software that includes Windows
Media Services.241 The U.S. Department of Justice again criticized the
KFTC decision and remedy as going “beyond what is necessary or
appropriate to protect consumers, as it requires the removal of products that
consumers may prefer.”242
In subsequent Microsoft disputes and matters involving other
companies, China has required licensing of intellectual property rights and
changes in royalty amounts in both merger and conduct cases.243 It is also
worth noting that regardless of current U.S. enforcement practices, the littleused Article 40 of the TRIPs agreement of the World Trade Organization
expressly permits the licensing of intellectual property rights as a remedy
for violations of competition law.244

239

Waller & Tasch, Harmonizing Essential Facilities, supra note 233, at 752–58. See also JOSE
ANTONIO BATISTA DE MOURA ZIERBARTH, ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE IN BRAZILIAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 21 (2010); DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, COMPETITION
COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., LATIN AMERICAN COMPETITION FORUM,
COMPETITION PRINCIPLES IN ESSENTIAL FACILITIES 10 (2010).
240
In re M/S Karachi Stock Exchange (Guarantee) LTD., (2007) File No. 12/ISE/Sec.3/CCP/2007,
at 58–60 (Pak.), http://www.cc.gov.pk/images/Downloads/Latest%20KSE-Order%2029-5-09.pdf.
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ANDREW I. GAVIL & HARRY FIRST, THE MICROSOFT ANTITRUST CASES: COMPETITION POLICY
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 230–32 (2014); Joseph Seon Hur, Analysis of the Korea Fair Trade
Commission Decision on Microsoft’s Tie-in Sales of Applications Programs with Windows Operating
Systems, 3 COMP. L. INT’L 3, 9 (2007); Youngjin Jung, Abuse of Market Dominance in Korea: Some
Reflections on the KFTC’s Microsoft Decision, 36 LEGAL ISSUES ECON. INTEGRATION 57, 71–73 (2009).
242
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of Deputy Assistant Attorney General J. Bruce
McDonald Regarding Korean Fair Trade Commission’s Decision in its Microsoft Case (Dec. 7, 2005),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2005/December/05_at_648.html.
243
See generally Zhaoqi Cen, China, in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST REVIEW
23 (Thomas Vinje ed., 3d ed. 2018) (discussing IP law in China); Yee Wah Chin, Intellectual Property
Rights and Antitrust in China, in IP PROTECTION IN CHINA 299 (Donna P. Suchy ed., 2015) (same).
244
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 40, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33
I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
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The divergence over the proper standards for single firm conduct is the
most widely acknowledged of the gaps between U.S. views and the rest of
the world. I now turn to what is considered the proper domain for
competition law, where again the United States finds itself increasingly an
outlier.
II. THE DOMAIN OF COMPETITION LAW
The United States defines the antitrust laws as the substantive provisions
of the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission acts along with a
small number of subsidiary statutes. This limits the scope of antitrust law to
agreements between competitors, monopolization law, and the review of
potentially harmful mergers and acquisitions. In contrast, the EU and other
jurisdictions have led the world to a broader understanding of the meaning
and reach of competition law that is only partially understood or appreciated
in the United States.245 This Section explores that broader vision of
competition including market studies and investigations; prohibitions
against public anticompetitive conduct; state aids; and the use of public
interest factors normally not part of the U.S. vision of the antitrust enterprise.
A. Market Studies and Market Investigations
The competition toolkit for many jurisdictions also includes provisions
for market studies in addition to specific enforcement actions. As noted by
the OECD:
Market studies assess whether competition in a market is
working efficiently, and identify measures to address any
issues that are identified. These measures can include
recommendations such as proposals for regulatory reform or
improving information dissemination amongst consumers.
They can also include the opening of antitrust
investigations.246
These analyses are used to identify restraints to competitions which are
not limited to outright violations of existing competition laws247 and are used
for competition advocacy, pre-enforcement information gathering, ex-post
assessments, law reform, and the creation of new legal regimes on an
industry specific basis.248
245

Philip Marsden & Spencer Weber Waller, Citizen Fox: The Global Antitrust Vision of Eleanor
Fox
1–2
(Mar.
22,
2017)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2939336.
246
Market Studies and Competition, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/market-studiesand-competition.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2019).
247
Id.
248
Id.
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In recent years, the OECD has held roundtable workshops, conducted
surveys of past and current market studies, and worked with individual
jurisdictions regarding this valuable tool of competition policy and
advocacy.249 The World Bank and the International Competition Network
also have been active in this area and provided financial support and
technical assistance to smaller and developing jurisdictions seeking to
conduct appropriate market studies in numerous industries including
financial services, food retailing, and telecommunications.250
A 2016 OECD survey indicated that sixty-eight percent of jurisdictions
surveyed had specific powers to undertake such surveys and another twentysix percent relied on more general competition powers to do so.251 Eightyseven percent of the respondents reported that recommendations to the
government for changes in laws, regulations, or public policies were one of
the potential outcomes for such inquiries.252 In some jurisdictions, the
sectoral regulators have such powers either alone or in conjunction with the
competition authority.253
On several occasions, the result has been the creation of a sectoral
specific code of competition fine-tuned for industry characteristics and the
nature of the competitive issues. One example is the United Kingdom which,
after an extensive market investigation254 of the supermarket industry,
created an industry code of conduct with specific rules for suppliersupermarket relations, a dispute resolution procedure, and an ombudsman.255
Similarly, Australia has specific industry codes for competition for
franchising, horticulture, groceries, wheat, and oil.256 Australia also has a
249

Id.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., THE ROLE OF MARKET STUDIES AS A TOOL TO
PROMOTE COMPETITION 4 (2016), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF(2016)4/en/pdf
[hereinafter OECD MARKET STUDY SURVEY]; see also Market Studies Information Store, INT’L
COMPETITION
NETWORK,
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/workinggroups/current/advocacy/amsis/sectors.aspx (listing market studies by sector and jurisdiction).
251
OECD MARKET STUDY SURVEY, supra note 250, at 9.
252
Id. at 8.
253
Id. at 10.
254
See id. at 17 (discussing the technical distinctions between market studies and market
investigations).
255
COMPETITION COMMISSION, SUPERMARKETS: A REPORT ON THE SUPPLY OF GROCERIES FROM
MULTIPLE
STORES
IN
THE
UNITED
KINGDOM,
2000
(UK),
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.competition-commission.org.uk//rep_pub/
reports/2000/446super.htm. See generally Paul W. Dobson, Exploiting Buyer Power: Lessons from the
British Grocery Trade, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 529 (2005) (providing an overview of how “increased
concentration in grocery retailing in Great Britain has raised issues about the buying power of multiple
retailers”). See also Press Release, Competition & Mkt. Auth., CMA Investigates Funerals Sector (June
1, 2018) (UK), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-investigates-funerals-sector (announcing
most recent CMA market study).
256
Franchising Code of Conduct, Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes, Franchising)
Regulation 2014, made under Competition and Consumer Act 2010, reg. 168 (Austl.); Horticulture Code
of Conduct, Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes, Horticulture) Regulation 2017, made under
250
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separate statutory provision permitting the creation of access provisions to
designated infrastructure.257
In contrast, the United States competition agencies have more limited
powers and appetite to conduct such studies and no current ability to
consider whether antitrust enforcement actions or an industry specific code
would be an appropriate response. The Justice Department has no statutory
powers to require the production of business information outside of a
specific enforcement action. This is extremely rare. In the 2016 OECD
survey of sixty competition authorities, only the U.S. Justice Department
and Hong Kong lacked the power to request such information.258
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has such powers, but chooses to
use them in a more limited fashion. Section 46 of the FTC Act provides the
Commission with the power to “gather and compile information concerning,
and to investigate from time to time the organization, business, conduct,
practices, and management of any person, partnership, or corporation
engaged in or whose business affects commerce, [exempting certain
industries] . . . and its relation to other persons, partnerships, and
corporations.”259
While it is conceivable that section 46 could be used to conduct broader
market studies of concentrated industries and the contemplation of industry
specific antitrust rules, the FTC has not chosen to do so in recent years. Since
2006, the FTC has used section 46 to produce thoughtful reports to analyze
such issues as E-cigarettes,260 cigarette and smokeless tobacco data
collection,261 merger divestiture remedies,262 food and beverage marketing
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Austl.); Food and Grocery Code of Conduct, Competition and
Consumer (Industry Codes, Food and Grocery) Regulation 2015, made under Competition and
Consumer Act 2010 (Austl.); Port Terminal Access (Bulk Wheat) Code of Conduct, Competition and
Consumer (Industry Codes, Port Terminal Access (Bulk Wheat)) Regulation 2014, made under
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Austl.); Oil Code, Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes,
Oil) Regulations 2017, made under Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Austl.).
257
See generally Competition and Consumer Act 2010, (Cth) div 44AA (Austl.) (promoting “use
of . . . the infrastructure by which services are provided, thereby promoting effective competition in
upstream and downstream markets”).
258
OECD MARKET STUDY SURVEY, supra note 250, at 12.
259
15 U.S.C. § 46(a) (2012).
260
FTC Seeks Public Comments on Proposed Study of the E-Cigarette Industry (Oct. 2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/federal_register_notices/2016/10/161028_ecigarettes_final_30-day_frn_10-27-16gg.pdf.
261
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CIGARETTE REPORT FOR 2014 (2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-cigarette-report-2014federal-trade-commission-smokeless-tobacco-report/ftc_cigarette_report_2014.pdf (last visited Aug. 19,
2019); FED. TRADE COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SMOKELESS TOBACCO REPORT FOR 2014
(2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-cigarette-report2014-federal-trade-commission-smokeless-tobacco-report/ftc_smokeless_tobacco_report_2014.pdf
(last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
262
Remedy Study, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/policy/studies/remedy-study (last
visited Aug. 19, 2019).
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to children, homeowners insurance, automobile insurance, alcoholic
beverage advertising,266 patent assertion entities,267 generic drugs,268
consumer fraud,269 and data sharing practices among corporate affiliates.270
This list includes numerous important consumer protection matters and
certain competition issues that cut across industry lines (patent trolls and
merger remedies)271 but only one specific competition-related study of a
particular industry (generic drugs).272 This valuable study included
proposals for legislative reform for vexing problems with the gaming of the
system for the introduction and approval of generic drugs.273
The United States’ experience with sector specific antitrust codes is
largely limited to the 1921 Packer and Stockyard Act274 which was enacted
because of Progressive Era concerns with the imbalance of power between
small livestock producers as sellers and the large concentrated (and often
colluding) meat packers as buyers. Even here, government failure to update
the regulations under this act for modern times and judicial reinterpretation
of the Act to more closely track the general antitrust laws has made this

263
Food Marketing to Children and Adolescents, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/foodmarketing-to-children-and-adolescents (last visited Aug. 19, 2019).
264
FTC Orders Nine Insurers to Submit Information for Study of the Effect of Credit-Based
Insurance Scores on Consumers of Homeowners Insurance, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 23, 2008),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/12/ftc-orders-nine-insurers-submit-informationstudy-effect-credit.
265
FED. TRADE COMM’N, CREDIT-BASED INSURANCE SCORES: IMPACTS ON CONSUMERS OF
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2007),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/credit-based-insurance-scores-impactsconsumers-automobile-insurance-report-congress-federal-trade/p044804facta_report_creditbased_insurance_scores.pdf.
266
FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATION IN THE ALCOHOL INDUSTRY: REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/selfregulation-alcohol-industry-report-federal-trade-commission/140320alcoholreport.pdf.
267
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY: AN FTC STUDY (2016),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/patent-assertion-entity-activity-ftcstudy/p131203_patent_assertion_entity_activity_an_ftc_study_0.pdf [hereinafter FTC PATENT
ASSERTION STUDY].
268
FED. TRADE COMM’N, AUTHORIZED GENERIC DRUGS: SHORT-TERM EFFECTS AND LONG-TERM
IMPACT (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/authorized-generic-drugsshort-term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission/authorized-generic-drugsshort-term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-trade-commission.pdf.
269
Notice, 81 Fed. Reg. 234 (Dec. 6, 2016).
270
Notice and Request for Comment, 76 Fed. Reg. 17 (Jan. 26, 2011).
271
FTC PATENT ASSERTION STUDY, supra note 267.
272
FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY
(2002),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patentexpiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf.
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Id. at i–xi.
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7 U.S.C. § 181-229b (2012).
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experiment a highly criticized and mostly ineffective tool to achieve its
intended purpose.275
B. Competition and the Public Sector
The United States tends to view antitrust law as a narrow and specialized
field applying only to private economic activity. U.S. antitrust does not reach
most restraints on competition imposed by the federal, state, or local
government. Restraints on competition imposed by the U.S. Congress are
immune from the antitrust law so long as the intent of Congress is clear to
achieve some result at odds with the baseline rules of the antitrust laws.276
Restraints by state governments are immune from the antitrust law under
the antitrust “state action” doctrine where the state has clearly articulated a
policy of something other than the competition otherwise mandated by the
federal antitrust laws.277 The Supreme Court justified this sweeping
judicially-created exception to the antitrust laws on the grounds that the
Sherman and Clayton acts were intended to regulate private market conduct,
and not sovereign state government.278 To do otherwise also would raise
important federalism concerns under the Constitution.279
Anticompetitive private conduct pursuant to immune state action would
also be protected so long as the state further actively supervised the private
conduct in question.280 Otherwise unlawful local government action would
be similarly protected if the local government had been delegated the power
to regulate the activity in question by the state through constitutional,
legislative, or judicial decision.281 Moreover, local governments are immune
from most damage awards under the antitrust laws, and are only subject to
prospective injunctive relief.282
The domain of competition law is substantially broader outside the
United States. From its inception, the EU has applied its competition law to
the public sector and private firms receiving special privileges from the state,
rather than shielding such firms as in the United States.

275

PETER C. CARSTENSEN, COMPETITION POLICY AND THE CONTROL OF BUYER POWER: A
GLOBAL ISSUE 143 (2017) (“The PSA in the United States illustrates the challenges that less-thantransparent standards create.”); Peter C. Carstensen, The Packers and Stockyards Act: A History of
Failure to Date, CPI ANTITRUST J., Apr. 2010, at 2; Roger A. McEowen et al., The 2002 Senate Farm
Bill: The Ban on Packer Ownership of Livestock, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 267, 271 (2002).
276
Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 481–82 (2006) (“Congress intended to retain immunity
only for injuries arising because mail either fails to arrive or arrives late, . . . or at the wrong address,
since such harms are primarily identified with the Postal Service’s function of transporting mail.”).
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Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363 (1943).
278
Id. at 350–51.
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Id. at 352.
280
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015).
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Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 51 (1982).
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Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984) (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 34–36).
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This decision relates to a combination of factors. These include the
historically larger role of the public sector in most of the member states, the
legacy of state enterprises in the former socialist Eastern European member
states, and the existence of numerous privatized undertakings that still
enjoyed a dominant position through their control of formerly public
infrastructure.
Article 106 of the TFEU sets forth the ground rules for the application
of the EU competition rules to public enterprises and private undertaking
enjoying special privileges. It states:
1. In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which
Member States grant special or exclusive rights, Member
States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure
contrary to the rules contained in the Treaties, in particular to
those rules provided for in Article 18 and Articles 101 to 109
[the competition rules].
2. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of
general economic interest or having the character of a revenueproducing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in
the Treaties, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far
as the application of such rules does not obstruct the
performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned
to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such
an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Union.
3. The Commission shall ensure the application of the
provisions of this Article and shall, where necessary, address
appropriate directives or decisions to Member States.283
These rules are vigorously enforced by the Commission and the ECJ.284
The EU Commission has also enacted a number of regulations under Article
106(3) to affirmatively facilitate competition in industries such as
telecommunications and other forms of infrastructure.285
C. State Aids as Competition Law
The EU rules on state aids as part of competition law are equally
unfamiliar in the U.S. context. Article 107 of the TFEU states:
283

TFEU art. 106.
See Case T-169/08, Dimosia Epicheirisi Ilektrismou AE (DEI) v. Comm’n, [2016] 4 C.M.L.R.
26, 233–39 (finding violation of Article 106 regarding operation of electrical utility). See generally ARIEL
EZRACHI, EU COMPETITION LAW: AN ANALYTICAL GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES (6th ed. 2018)
(collecting cases).
285
See generally 2 SPENCER WEBER WALLER & ANDRE FIEBIG, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD § 17.08 (4th ed. 2019).
284
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Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by
a Member State or through State resources in any form
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition
by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain
goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member
States, be incompatible with the internal market.286
The treaty spells out certain automatic and discretionary exceptions to
permit member states to address poverty, regional economic development,
environmental concerns, and other social needs that are not likely to distort
competition within the EU.287 The EU Commission reviews all state aids in
conjunction with the member states.
If, after giving notice to the parties concerned to submit their
comments, the Commission finds that aid granted by a State
or through State resources is not compatible with the internal
market . . . , or that such aid is being misused, it shall decide
that the State concerned shall abolish or alter such aid within
a period of time to be determined by the Commission.288
Regulations can be adopted by the Commission, and exemptions can be
adopted through a proposal of the Commission and granted by the Council
of Ministers in consultation with the European Parliament.289
A vast and complicated jurisprudence has arisen as to when and how
state aids to undertakings are incompatible with the provisions of Article
107. At the risk of oversimplifying, state aids are unlawful if they provide
benefits on terms more favorable than the undertaking could obtain in the
private sector.290 This can apply to outright grants, below market loans or
other financing, tax concessions, or any other tangible benefit on below
market terms. State aids found to be incompatible with the common market
are required to be clawed back by the member state from the recipient. One
recent example is the EU Commission’s controversial decision that tax
concessions granted to Apple by the Republic of Ireland were incompatible
with the common market and capable of distorting competition.291 Other
286

TFEU art. 107.
Id. art. 107(2), (3).
288
Id. art. 108(2).
289
Id. art. 109.
290
PIET JAN SLOT & MARTIN FARLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPETITION LAW 265–67 (2d ed.
2017). See generally EU STATE AID CONTROL: LAW AND ECONOMICS (Philipp Werner & Vincent
Verouden eds., 2016) (discussing when State aids distort competition); CONOR QUIGLEY, EUROPEAN
STATE AID LAW AND POLICY (3d ed. 2015); Diheng Xu, Rationale Behind State Aid Control Over Tax
Incentives, 41 WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. REV. 255, 255 (2018) (highlighting how “distortion of
competition is forbidden, since, if certain economic participants are favoured unfairly by State aid
measures, the level playing field may be at risk”).
291
Commission Decision 2017/1283/EC, SA.38373 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) (ex 2014/CP)
implemented by Ireland to Apple, 2016 O.J. (L 187) 1, 52–53, 109.
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pending state aid investigations and decisions relating to tax concessions
focus on Amazon and Starbucks, among other U.S. corporations.292
Certain EU member states also have their own national state aids
provisions. Countries like Ukraine are obliged to enforce state aids
provisions as part of preferential trade agreements with the EU.293 Ironically,
the United Kingdom does not currently have state aids as part of the CMA’s
competition toolkit but will be adopting such provisions as part of the Brexit
process along with a significant increase in its staff to enforce these
provisions.294
Outside the EU, there is a wide mixture of practices as to state aids as
part of the competition toolbox. State aids provisions are most common in
regional trade agreements to ensure competitive neutrality among members
of the trading bloc.295 Other jurisdictions bar state aids which affect
competitive neutrality within their national economies.296
The United States simply lacks this important tool. As a result, states
vigorously compete with each other to provide incentives to lure or retain
businesses within their territory usually to the net detriment of the taxpayers
of that state.297
D. Public Interest Factors
Statutes providing a national government, ministry, or competition
agency the explicit power to sacrifice competition for national security,
employment, or some other significant public interest are common outside
the United States. Such “public interest” overrides are most common in
merger review, but certain jurisdictions have such provisions for
anticompetitive agreements and/or abuse of dominance cases as well.
292

U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S RECENT STATE AID INVESTIGATIONS
TRANSFER PRICING RULES 2 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/Documents/White-Paper-State-Aid.pdf; Amedeo Arena, State Aids and Tax Rulings: An
Assessment of the Commission’s Recent Decisional Practice, 1 MKT. & COMPETITION L. REV. 49, 54
(2017).
293
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD REVIEWS OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY
UKRAINE 14 (2016), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/UKRAINE-OECD-Reviews-of-CompetitionLaw-and-Policy_WEBENG.pdf; Getting the Deal Through: State Aid 2016. Ukraine, ASTERS (Aug. 31,
2016), https://www.asterslaw.com/ru/press_center/news/state_aid_ukraine/.
294
Oborne Clark, How Will State Aid Be Regulated in the UK in the Event of a No Deal Brexit?,
LEXOLOGY (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=186a4a3c-b95b-46f8-969534d562966d94.
295
See BERNARD HOEKMAN, WORLD BANK CTR. FOR ECON. POLICY RESEARCH, COMPETITION
POLICY
AND
PREFERENTIAL
TRADE
AGREEMENTS
6
(2002),
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01006/WEB/IMAGES/WBI37131.PDF (discussing state aid
provisions in the EEA, the EU Association, and free trade agreements).
296
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., POLICY ROUNDTABLE ON COMPETITION, STATE AID,
AND SUBSIDIES 10 (2010).
297
Mark Strassmann, Amazon HQ2: 20 Finalists Competing to Host New Headquarters, CBS
NEWS (Jan. 18, 2018, 6:46 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/amazon-hq2-20-finalists-competingto-host-new-headquarters/.
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The EU has a provision that has been used for public interest purposes
in the past. Article 101(3) of the TFEU provides:
The provisions of [Article 101(1)] may, however, be declared
inapplicable in the case of:
– any agreement or category of agreements between
undertakings,
– any decision or category of decisions by associations of
undertakings,
– any concerted practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the production or distribution
of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress,
while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit,
and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which
are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question.298
This provision has been used to exempt otherwise anticompetitive
agreements which violated Article 101(3) in order to validate so-called crisis
cartels, deal with the Arab oil embargo, promote environmental goals, and
deal with other public interest factors that go beyond the effect of an
agreement on competition.299 While Article 101(3) is rarely used recently in
this manner, it remains a potent weapon for future court cases and decisions
of national competition authorities.
Numerous jurisdictions have public interest standards in their merger
laws allowing the approval or rejection of transactions on grounds other than
their competitive effects.300 One of the most prominent is the Republic of
South Africa, which introduced the modern form of its competition law in
1998 as part of the post-apartheid legal and political regime.301
298

TFEU art. 101(3); see also id. art. 346 (addressing national security).
2 WALLER & FIEBIG, supra note 285, ch. 17; RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION
LAW 166–68 (Oxford Univ. Press 9th ed. 2018); Andre Fiebig, Crisis Cartels and the Triumph of
Industrial Policy Over Competition Law in Europe, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 607, 622–23 (1999).
300
DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, COMPETITION CO., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION
& DEV., SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION OF THE ROUNDTABLE ON PUBLIC INTEREST CONSIDERATIONS IN
MERGER
CONTROL
2
(2017),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/WP3/M(2016)1/ANN4/FINAL/en/pdf.
301
See Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in the Merger Regulation Under
the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998, GN 309 of GG 40039 (2 June 2016),
http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Gov-Gazette-Public-Interest-Guidlines.pdf
(“These guidelines seek to provide guidance regarding the Commission’s approach to analyzing mergers
by indicating the approach that the Commission is likely to follow and the types of information that the
Commission may require when evaluating public interest grounds . . . .”).
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The economic empowerment of the previously oppressed black majority
population was a critical goal of the competition regime.302 As a result, the
South African merger regime permits anticompetitive mergers to be
approved on specified public interest grounds.303 The law also permits the
denial on public interest grounds of mergers that are otherwise innocuous
with respect to competition.304
In addition to the effect on competition, the South African merger
regime also requires consideration of the merger’s effect on:
1) A particular industrial sector or region;
2) Employment;
3) The ability of small businesses or firms controlled by
black persons to become competitive; and
4) The ability of national industries to compete in
international markets.305
The South African Competition Commission has issued guidelines to
implement this additional facet of their merger control regime, 306 and the
competition tribunal has applied the statute and guidelines in key case law.307
Similar public interest standards exist in such diverse competition regimes
as Malawi and New Zealand, and are often a key component of the political
support behind the enactment of competition law in the first place in such
jurisdictions.308
U.S. statutes and case law do not permit the consideration of such
general social welfare factors in an antitrust case. In the Professional
Engineers case, the U.S. Supreme Court summarily rejected the defendant’s
proposed affirmative defense that the competitive bidding process for public
302

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA:
AN
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REVIEW
3–4,
7,
9
(2003),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/prosecutionandlawenforcement/2958714.pdf.
303
Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 12A (S. Afr.).
304
Id.
305
Id.
306
Guidelines on the Assessment of Public Interest Provisions in the Merger Regulation Under the
Competition Act No. 89 of 1998, GN 309 of GG 40039 (2 June 2016), http://www.compcom.co.za/wpcontent/uploads/2016/01/Gov-Gazette-Public-Interest-Guidlines.pdf.
307
In the large merger between Shell South Africa (Pty) Ltd. and Tepco Petroleum (Pty) Ltd. 2002
1 (Tribunal)at 9 para. 36 (S. Afr.); Minister of Econ. Dev. & Others v. Competition Tribunal & Others,
S. African Commercial, Catering & Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU) v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc. &
Another 2012 1 (ZACAC 2) at 8 para. 11, 69 para. 110, 111 (S. Afr.). See also Michael-James Currie,
South Africa Competition Tribunal: Merging Parties Penalised for Failure to Comply with Public
Interest
Conditions,
AFRICAN
ANTITRUST
&
COMPETITION
L.,
https://africanantitrust.com/2018/07/03/south-africa-competition-tribunal-merging-parties-penalisedfor-failure-to-comply-with-public-interest-conditions/amp/?__twitter_impression=true (last accessed
Aug. 17, 2019) (penalizing merging parties for not complying with monitoring conditions of post-merger
employment).
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Competition
&
Fair
Trading
Act
1998,
§§
35–38
(Malawi),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mw/mw003en.pdf; Commerce Act 1986, s 3A (N.Z.).
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works could produce a threat to public safety in the form of shoddy
engineering work by unscrupulous engineers making unrealistic low ball
bids and potentially using substandard materials or construction
techniques.309 This could be true in particular instances, but it was legally
irrelevant to the court.310 It was legally irrelevant as well in earlier cases (1)
that competition might not be an appropriate public policy for certain
industries or (2) that the defendants in fact agreed upon a reasonable price.311
Similarly, the United States does not have public interest standards
incorporated into its merger laws. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits
those mergers and acquisitions which may tend to substantially lessen
competition or may tend to create a monopoly.312 The Horizontal Merger
Guidelines and the limited modern case law do not allow for consideration
of other important social factors such as employment, economic
development, environmental effects, racial justice, or other public factors in
the analysis of the competitive effects of a proposed or consummated
transaction.313 While certain commentators have advocated for more explicit
use of public interest standards in U.S. antitrust policy more generally and
in merger policy in particular,314 change in this direction seems unlikely for
the foreseeable future.
While the United States does not have public interest standards in its
merger regime, certain mergers in regulated industries may be subject to
approval by sectoral regulators that do have explicit “public interest”
powers. One prominent example is the Federal Communication
Commission, which must consider the effect on both competition and the
public interest in considering a media merger subject to its jurisdiction.315
Similarly, the banking agencies may also consider the broader public interest
in addition to competitive effects in considering a merger or acquisition
within their jurisdiction.316
309

Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684–85, 692 (1978).
Id. at 692.
311
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397–98 (1927); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283–87, 293 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); United States v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 320–27 (1897).
312
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
313
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf
(providing
guidelines on how the agencies determine anticompetitive behavior with no mention of examining
important social factors such as employment, economic development, environmental effects, and racial
justice).
314
See generally MAURICE E. STUCKE & ARIEL EZRACHI, COMPETITION OVERDOSE (forthcoming
Mar. 17, 2020) (using examples to illustrate how society overprescribed competition as a solution);
Richard Brunell, The Social Costs of Mergers: Restoring Local Control as a Factor in Merger Policy,
85 N.C. L. REV. 149 (2006) (maintaining that “the loss of local control should be restored as a factor in
merger policy”).
315
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
316
Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (2012).
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The United States also has rarely used statutes allowing non-competition
factors to supersede competitive analysis to achieve national security
objectives. Mergers may be blocked on national security grounds even if
cleared by the competition agencies.317 In addition, the Defense Production
Act of 1950 (DPA) allows the President to exempt agreements between
private parties from the application of the antitrust laws where such action
was taken for the national defense.318
It is important to note that even in the limited situations where a broader
public interest is applied, such a process is assigned outside of the
competition agencies. This is in marked contrast to the practice of
jurisdictions such as South Africa and elsewhere where the competition
agencies and tribunals integrate both competition and public interest criteria
into the analysis of a particular transaction or practice.
III. ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURES
While there are a wide diversity of public agency structures for the
competition law enforcement, the United States sticks out like a bit of a sore
thumb. The United States has a unique system of two partially overlapping
agencies: the FTC, which has jurisdiction over both competition and
consumer cases, and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, which
investigates and brings only competition cases.319 The FTC has jurisdiction
over the civil enforcement of competition cases, while the Antitrust Division
has both civil and criminal enforcement powers and is the sole enforcer of
criminal antitrust cases.320 The Antitrust Division has authority to bring
cases under the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, while the FTC brings its
actions under section 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of
competition.”321 Section 5 of the FTC Act has been interpreted to cover all
violations of the Sherman and Clayton acts as well as a vague penumbra of
unfair practices that consist of incipient violations of the antitrust laws or
violations of the spirit of those provisions.322
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department brings its cases in
federal court before the United States District Court that has personal
jurisdiction and venue over the defendants charged with a civil or criminal
317

Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(4)(A), (d) (2012).
50 U.S.C. §§ 4558(j), 4565(d) (2012).
319
Guide to Antitrust Laws: The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/enforcers (last visited Aug. 25, 2019).
320
Id.
321
15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012).
322
FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 235 (1972); Donald S. Clark, Statement of
Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act,
FED.
TRADE
COMMISSION
(Aug.
13,
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pd
f.
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antitrust violation. The U.S. FTC brings most of its merger cases directly in
federal district court in the same manner.323 The FTC also brings certain
cases through an internal administrative procedure where the losing
respondent can appeal to the relevant appellate court.324 To make matters
more confusing, the standards for a preliminary injunction in a merger case
in administrative FTC litigation are slightly different from the standards in
federal district court. There is pending legislation that would harmonize the
two standards in favor of the more stringent district court standards.325
While the two agencies have similar enforcement powers in civil
antitrust matters, they have different origins and structures. The Antitrust
Division is part of the U.S. Justice Department, itself part of the Executive
Branch.326 The head of the Antitrust Division holds the title of an Assistant
Attorney General, is selected by the Attorney General with the concurrence
of the President, and is subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate.327 The
Deputy Assistant Attorneys General in charge of the various operating
sections of the Antitrust Division are selected by the head of the Antitrust
Division and are also subject to Senate confirmation.328
In contrast, the Federal Trade Commission is an independent federal
agency subject to the Administrative Procedures Act,329 the Sunshine in
Government Act,330 and other legal constraints similar to the plethora of
other administrative agencies in the federal government. The FTC is headed
by five presidentially appointed commissioners, no more than three of which
can be members of the same party as the President.331 Each commissioner is
subject to Senate confirmation and may not be removed from office during
their seven-year term except for good cause.332
This means that the United States has two strikingly similar agencies,
one subject to the normal constraints of administrative law and the other not,
despite a substantial overlap of function.333 The two agencies consult
informally with each other to assign all new investigations and merger
323

15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (2012).
16 C.F.R. § 3.52 (2018).
325
Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2018, H.R. 5645, 115th
Cong. § 2 (2018); S. 2847, 115th Cong. (2018).
326
Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Antitrust Division, U.S. DEP’T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual-antitrust-division (last visited
Aug. 27, 2019).
327
Assistant Attorney General, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/assistant-attorneygeneral (last visited Aug. 27, 2019).
328
28 U.S.C. § 506 (2012).
329
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96 (1946).
330
Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976).
331
15 U.S.C. § 41 (1950).
332
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 602 (1935).
333
Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (1998).
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reviews so only one agency will investigate any individual matter, but
Congress blocked formalizing such arrangements.334 While both agencies
view their mission as law enforcement, they each undertake a large number
of similar more regulatory functions such as issuing guidelines and advisory
opinions, engaging in competition advocacy, conducting research,
presenting workshops, participating in interagency decision making, and
representing the United States in various international organizations,
consultations, and negotiations. Not surprisingly, this unique situation has
led to numerous proposals to unify competition enforcement within a single
agency with some favoring consolidation in the FTC and others in the Justice
Department.335
It is more than just the dual nature of federal antitrust enforcement that
distinguishes the United States from the rest of the world. In the past, both
Brazil and China have had more than one competition law enforcer, but
Brazil has recently consolidated enforcement in a single agency and China
is in the process of doing so.336
Nor is it the main issue whether to combine competition and consumer
protection within one agency or split them between two specialist agencies.
There is no single right answer on this important question of institutional
design upon which reasonable people can differ.337 Over time, competition
agencies have added and shed related consumer protection jurisdiction, and
strong arguments can be made in favor of each model.338
334

Justin O’Neill Kay, Clearance: The Back Story and Looking Forward, ANTITRUST SOURCE,
Aug. 2012, at 12; FTC and DOJ Announce New Clearance Procedures for Antitrust Matters:
Memorandum of Agreement Allocates Industry Sectors Between Agencies, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
(Mar. 5, 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/03/ftc-and-doj-announce-newclearance-procedures-antitrust-matters.
335
Darren Bush, Out of the DOJ Ashes Rises the FTC Phoenix: How to Enhance Antitrust
Enforcement by Eliminating an Antitrust Enforcement Agency, 53 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 33, 52 (2016);
Waller, supra note 333; Ernest Gellhorn et al., Has Antitrust Outgrown Dual Enforcement? A Proposal
for Rationalization, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 695, 702 (1990).
336
Decreto No. 12.529, de 30 de Novembro de 2011, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
5.2012 (Braz.) (structuring the Brazilian System for Protection of Competition and setting forth
preventive measures and sanctions for violations against the economic order); see also ANA PAULA
MARTINEZ & MARIANA TAVERES DE ARAUJO, OVERVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW IN BRAZIL 257–58
(Cristianne Zarzur et al. eds., 2015) (explaining the current structure of Brazil’s competition law); Adrian
Emch, China to Merge Antitrust Authorities, KLUWER COMPETITION L. BLOG (Mar. 21, 2018),
http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2018/03/21/china-merge-antitrust-authorities/
(discussing Chinese antitrust authorities).
337
See generally Symposium, A Comparative Analysis of Antitrust Law Regimes: Designing Better
Institutions for Deciding Antitrust Issues, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 411 (2010) (discussing multiple
viewpoints on this issue); Spencer W. Waller, Antitrust Marathon IV: With Authority, 6 EUR. COMP. J. 1
(2010) (same).
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(2008),
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It is rather the center of decision authority that is the most important
difference between the United States and the rest of the world. The U.S.
system is primarily, but not exclusively, court based with the competition
agencies having to investigate a case with the goal of proving its case before
its independent federal district court judge enjoying life tenure and other
attributes of constitutionally guaranteed judicial independence.339
The U.S. agencies are first and foremost litigators having to prove their
cases before generalist judges in federal court to prevail. The Department of
Justice must bring all of its cases, both criminal and civil, in federal district
court. In civil cases, it is subject to the same rules of procedure and evidence
and the same burdens of pleadings, production, and proof as any other
litigant. The same is true for any merger case brought by the Federal Trade
Commission. In criminal cases, the Department of Justice is subject to the
same federal rules of criminal procedure and federal rules of evidence and
has the higher burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
This is in marked difference to the agency-centered model in most other
jurisdictions. In the EU and most member states, the competition agency
combines most, if not all, functions of investigation, litigation, adjudication,
and determination of remedy. This is true for mergers, abuse of dominance,
and most conduct cases, even those imposing extraordinarily large civil or
administrative fines. This has led to a broad body of criticism of such
agencies acting as prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner in the same case
and calls for greater separation of functions and greater use of independent
hearing officers and other reforms.340 Only the rare purely criminal case
outside the United States would be brought in the general court systems.341
These differences between the agency-centered and court based models
are also reflected in the nature of judicial review in the United States and
abroad. The losing party in a federal district court trial may appeal a final
judgment to the appropriate federal circuit court of appeals and if
unsuccessful seek discretionary review in the United States Supreme
policy); DIRECTORATE FOR FIN. & ENTER. AFFAIRS, COMPETITION COMM., ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., SUMMARY RECORD: ANNEX TO THE SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 123RD MEETING
OF
THE
COMPETITION COMMITTEE HELD ON 15-19 JUNE 2015, at 2 (2015),
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/M(2015)1/ANN
9/FINAL&docLanguage=En (describing the “key points of the roundtables on changes in institutional
design”); Model Law on Competition (2015) – Revised Chapter VIII, 6–7, ICN, U.N. Doc.
TD/RBF/CONF.8/L.3,
(May
21,
2015),
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/tdrbpconf8l3_en.pdf.
339
U.S. CONST. art. III.
340
Maciej Bernatt, McWane and Judicial Review of Federal Trade Commission Decisions: Any
Inspirations for EU Competition Law?, 38 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 288, 289 (2017).
341
In civil administrative FTC matters, the procedure is somewhat closer to the agency model, but
important safeguards exist along with separation of function between the agency staff investigating and
ligating cases and the commissioners adjudicating them. 1 STEPHANIE KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION § 8.3 (2018 ed.).
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342

Court. Factual findings by juries or by judges in bench trials are subject
to limited appellate review, but rulings of law are subject to de novo review
on appeal.343 The limited number of FTC administrative decisions in the
competition area are appealable by a losing respondent to the federal court
of appeals, and its factual findings and mixed findings of law and fact
normally are granted a measure of discretion and upheld if supported by
substantial evidence.344
Judicial review is a fundamental aspect of due process and is present in
virtually every legal system, but it often proceeds very differently than in the
United States. The EU system is a common system often replicated in
member states and other jurisdictions. The respondent may appeal an
adverse decision from the European Commission, an integrated agency, to
the General Court and then the Court of Justice. However, the General Court
grants substantial deference to the agency’s determination of the application
of law and economics to the facts of the case.345 In the EU, this is referred to
as the margin of discretion for complex economic evaluations.346 The ECJ’s
jurisdiction is then limited to matters of law. The combination of an
integrated agency structure, hefty fines, and lack of full de novo appellate
review has led to criticisms of violations of fundamental notions of due
process and human rights in such systems.347 These concerns are amplified
in any country where neither the competition agency nor the reviewing court
may have great expertise in competition matters nor substantial
independence from the more political branches of government.
In certain other judicial systems, competition law disputes are handled
by specialist tribunals and courts that include both competition law experts
and economists. For example, in Chile the government brings its cases
before a five-person expert tribunal that includes both expert competition
lawyers and economists.348 The tribunal also hears certain private
competition law claims for damages. Decisions of the tribunal are appealed
342
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (certiorari from decisions of circuit courts of appeal); id. § 1257 (certiorari
from decisions of highest state court); id. § 1291 (appeal to circuit courts from final judgments of district
courts).
343
U.S. CONST. art. VII (declaring that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in
any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law”).
344
McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 824 (11th Cir. 2015).
345
Microsoft EU, supra note 152, ¶¶ 87–89.
346
Bernatt, supra note 340, at 289.
347
See Maciej Bernatt, The Compatibility of Deferential Standard of Judicial Review in the EU
Competition Proceedings with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 1 (Loyola Univ.
Chi. Sch. of Law Inst. for Antitrust & Consumer Studies, Working Paper, 2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2447884 (discussing the counterarguments against
the deferential standard of review and surveying literature and suggesting that degree of appellate
deference be tied to independence and separation of functions at initial trial or hearing).
348
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CHILE-ACCESSION REPORT ON COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY 30–31, https://www.oecd.org/daf/47950954.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2017).
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349

to the Chilean Supreme Court. In still other systems, complaints are
resolved through administrative proceedings in the national competition
authority itself and then appealed to an expert tribunal.350
In other legal systems, there is a mix as to the matters that are heard by
specialized tribunals and generalist courts. In the UK, the specialized
Competition Appeals Tribunal hears all challenges to decisions of the
Competition and Markets Authority and also hears certain private
competition law damage actions.351 The general civil courts hear all other
private competition disputes for damages or injunctive relief or where
competition issues arise as a defense in related litigation.352 The general
criminal courts hear the limited number of criminal cases that have been
brought in the UK.353
As former FTC Chair William Kovacic has noted:
Relatively few of the 130 jurisdictions with competition laws
have adopted the U.S. litigation model and its supporting
institutions. The EU administrative enforcement regime is by
far the world’s dominant “operating system.” Nearly 80
percent of the world’s competition systems rely on an
administrative agency that takes decisions and imposes
sanctions subject to judicial review. Many countries have
adopted his [sic] model to facilitate accession to the European
Union. The administrative model also is more attractive to, and
compatible with, the civil law regime that most of the world’s
countries employ.354
Regardless of the merits of the U.S. litigation-based model, it remains
an outlier.
IV. REMEDIES AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
The United States has an almost unique system of competition remedies
with its heavy reliance on public criminal enforcement and private treble
damage litigation. In contrast, most other jurisdictions rely on a civil
administrative system of fines, limited criminal prosecutions, and a nascent
system of private damage litigation.
349

Id. at 30.
See Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34, s 75 (Can.) (discussing the matters reviewable by the
Canadian Competition Tribunal and how such matters are reviewable by the tribunal on application from
the Competition Commissioner).
351
SANDRA MARCO COLINO, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EU AND UK 136–37 (7th ed. 2011).
352
Id. at 137–39.
353
RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 459–60 (8th ed. 2015) (explaining the
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A. Criminal Enforcement
The United States is virtually alone with its reliance on criminal
enforcement as the primary remedy for hard-core cartel enforcement. The
United States helped form a consensus within the OECD to create a
recommendation against hard-core cartel.355 This is a soft law instrument
that does not require criminal penalties, but instead recommends the
adoption of:
a)
b)

Effective sanctions, of a kind and at a level adequate
to deter firms and individuals from participating in
such cartels; and
Enforcement procedures and institutions with powers
adequate to detect and remedy hard core cartels,
including powers to obtain documents and
information and to impose penalties for noncompliance.356

United States antitrust law has had criminal penalties since its inception
in 1890. Violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act have been
felonies since 1974.357 Penalties include imprisonment for up to ten years for
an individual and fines for corporations up to $100,000,000 or the higher of
double the gain or loss caused by the unlawful conduct.358
Criminal enforcement is reserved for hardcore violations of section 1 of
the Sherman Act of agreements between competitors such as price fixing,
bid rigging, production levels, territorial allocations, and customer
allocations.359 These violations are deemed per se unreasonable and almost
always prosecuted as criminal violations.360 Convictions or guilty pleas are
frequent and sentences average in excess of twenty-four months in prison.361
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Id. art. I.A.1.
357
Other portions of the antitrust laws also contain criminal sanctions which are not enforced at the
present. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (monopolization); id. § 13a (price discrimination); id. § 8 (trusts
in restraint of import trade).
358
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2.
359
Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prosecuting Antitrust
Crimes, at the Georgetown University Law Center Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium (Sept. 10,
2014), https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517741/download.
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Id. But see United States v. Apple, 791 F.3d 290, 321–22, 339 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding for the
Government in a civil injunction case brought against per se unlawful horizontal conspiracy of book
publishers facilitated by Apple, Inc.).
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While corporations cannot be imprisoned, criminal fines have been imposed
as high as $500,000,000.362
Outside the United States, practices vary widely. While most
jurisdictions condemn hard-core cartels, they differ as to how to punish
them. A 2015 survey found that more than thirty jurisdictions provide for
criminal penalties for antitrust violations, but most have done so within the
past twenty years.363 Few have successfully prosecuted a criminal case and
fewer still have actually imprisoned a defendant for such a violation. None
do so as a matter of routine as is the case in the United States.
There is a vigorous debate outside the United States whether, when, and
how to impose criminal penalties for competition violations. There are
reasonable arguments that criminal penalties may not be appropriate for
certain jurisdictions for substantive, procedural, institutional, or historical
reasons. Not every system provides for competition enforcement against
individuals rather than enterprises or undertakings. Not every system has a
competition agency with the power to directly prosecute a criminal offense,
and most rely on a more complicated referral and cooperation system with
the general criminal prosecutor. At the most fundamental level, not every
system views the violation of competition norms as the type of fraud and
theft by well-dressed thieves as price fixing is characterized in the United
States.364
For example, the EU has a vibrant competition system but the EU Treaty
does not provide for such criminal penalties or only imposes fines on
undertakings, rather than individuals. Neither of these bedrock principles is
likely to change.
Even a sophisticated competition enforcer like the UK Competition and
Markets Authority struggles with the rare criminal proceedings it has
brought to date.365 Countries like Mexico and Australia have only brought
362

United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2014), amended and superseded on
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364
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(2013).
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their first criminal proceedings in the past two years. New Zealand has
only enacted a criminal competition law provision in 2019.367
B. Administrative and Civil Fines
Most other jurisdictions rely instead on civil or administrative fines or
penalties to enforce against hard core cartel and related behaviors. The EU
competition regulations allow for fines up to ten percent of the worldwide
annual turnover of the undertakings found liable.368 This is combined with a
rebuttable presumption that parent corporations are responsible for the
violations of their subsidiaries. The result is fines that often exceed those in
the United States and have included fines as high as 4.3 billion euros.369 This
is the accepted type of remedy for most competition agencies throughout the
world. Civil or administrative fines typically are available up to a statutory
maximum or a percentage of the turnover of the respondent.
Neither the Antitrust Division nor the FTC can seek fines in civil
antitrust matters.370 The agencies are limited to civil injunctive relief, which
can include under certain limited circumstances restitution or disgorgement
of unlawful overcharges.371 Such creative injunctive remedies are helpful to
consumers, but are the exception and not the rule.
The Antitrust Division has another rarely used remedy. Section 4A of
the Clayton Act allows the government to sue for treble damages for any
overcharges the federal government paid as the buyer of products or services
366
See Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (2017) FCA
876 (Austl.); Solicita COFECE Acción Penal Contra Varias Personas que Pudieron Haberse Coludido en
la Venta de Bienes en el Sector Salud, Comisión Federal de Competencia Económica [COFECE Asks
for Criminal Prosecution of Several People Who Could Have Colluded in the Sale of Goods in the Health
Sector], COFECE (May 2, 2017), https://www.cofece.mx/solicita-cofece-accion-penal-contra-3personas-que-de-acuerdo-a-sus-investigaciones-se-coludieron-en-la-venta-de-bienes-en-el-sectorsalud/.
367
Commerce (Criminalisation of Cartels) Amendment Act 2019 (22-1) (N.Z.).
368
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 ch. VI, art. 23(2)(c), On the Implementation of the Rules
on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (Text with EEA relevance), 2003 O.J. (L
001), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32003R0001&from=En.
369
European Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €4.34
Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s
Search Engine, Brussels (July 18, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm; see
also Case AT.39740, Google Search (Shopping), [2017] 4 C.M.L.R. 12 (imposing a separate two billion
euro fine for an earlier decision).
370
Harry First, The Case for Antitrust Civil Penalties, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 127, 127–28 (2009).
Recently, the chair of the FTC has testified in favor of having such powers. Joe Simons, Chairman, Fed.
Trade Comm’n, Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission at the Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Digital Commerce and Consumer Protection, United States House of Representatives,
at
6–7
(July
18,
2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1394526/p180101_ftc_testimony_re_ov
ersight_house_07182018.pdf.
371
FTC v. Abbvie, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 3d 98, 138, 144 (E.D. Pa. 2018).
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372

as a result of an antitrust violation.
Despite the enormous size of
government purchases and the obvious benefits of treble damages to
taxpayers, this remedy has been used only sporadically over the years. More
recently, the head of the Antitrust Division has stated that he intends to use
such suits on a more regular basis.373
C. Private Enforcement
The other critical fault line between the United States and the rest of the
world is the prevalence of private treble damage rights of action in the U.S.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act allows all persons injured in their business or
property as a result of an antitrust violation to sue for treble damages plus
attorneys’ fees and costs.374 Private persons may also seek injunctive relief,
declaratory judgments, and assert antitrust violations as affirmative defenses
or counterclaims if sued.375
Private antitrust treble damage actions predominate in the United States
at a scale unknown in other jurisdictions. Depending on the year, the ratio
of private rights of action to federal government cases may be more than
twenty to one.376 Many are follow-on cases to government criminal cartel
cases that are presumptive evidence of a violation in a subsequent private
case, leaving the private plaintiff to prove only standing and the amount of
harm.377
The treble damage remedy in the United States has existed since the
passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. However, a vast expansion of private
antitrust litigation took place in the mid-twentieth century because of the
interaction of various statutory rights and judicial decisions. First, only
successful plaintiffs, rather than defendants, are entitled to attorneys’ fees
and costs.378 This distinguishes the antitrust laws from the general U.S. rule
that parties pay their own fees and costs, as well as the general rule outside
the United States that all losing parties pay the prevailing party’s fees and
372

15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
ANTITRUST SOURCE, ENFORCERS ROUNDTABLE AT THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION
OF
ANTITRUST
SPRING
MEETING
IN
WASHINGTON
D.C.
23
(2018),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1387878/ohlhausen__enforcers_roundtable_3-30-18_.pdf (transcript available through the American Bar Association)
(statement of Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division); Barry Nigro, Deputy
Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Keynote Remarks at the American Bar Association’s Antitrust
in
Healthcare
Conference:
A
Prescription
for
Competition
(May
17,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-assistant-attorney-general-barry-nigro-delivers-keynoteremarks-american-bar.
374
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012).
375
15 U.S.C. § 16 (2012).
376
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF ANTITRUST LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES: A HANDBOOK ix (Albert
A. Foer & Randy M. Stutz eds., 2012).
377
15 U.S.C. § 5 (2012).
378
Id. § 15.
373
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costs. Second, normal tort rules about joint and several liability apply,
making each defendant potentially liable for the full amount of any judgment
(after trebling).379 However, contribution between tortfeasors is not
permitted, preventing a defendant from suing its fellow defendants for their
share of liability.380 Third, antitrust judgments as intentional torts may not
be insurable, depending on the precise provisions of state law.381 Fourth,
normal rules about in pari delicto or unclean hands do not apply in antitrust
litigation and do not bar a party who unwillingly participated in a violation
from suing to undo an unlawful arrangement or for treble damages where
applicable.382 Finally, settlements by co-defendants are deductible, but only
pre-trebling,383 leaving non-settling defendants potentially responsible for
the vast amount of a treble damage verdict.
The United States also has general civil procedure rules, unknown in
other jurisdictions, which strengthen private antitrust litigation. These
include the federal and state constitutional right to jury trial,384 the
unpredictability and size of potential jury awards, the extensive system of
discovery in U.S. civil litigation,385 the availability of contingent fees, and
the existence of meaningful class actions since the 1960s.386
At the same time, there has been a judicial and legislative response that
has narrowed private antitrust somewhat. The courts have created doctrines
of antitrust standing,387 antitrust injury,388 and bars on indirect purchaser
actions,389 which have limited both certain types of actions and certain
categories of plaintiffs. Pleadings requirements have been tightened, first in
antitrust conspiracy cases,390 and then more generally in all civil litigation.391
Summary judgment for defendants was made easier for all defendants in a
379

Tex. Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981).
Id. at 646. But judgment sharing agreements are enforceable and agreements to indemnify have
been held to be enforceable as well. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4738, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (holding that the “defendants’ judgment sharing
agreement is not unlawful”).
381
MITCHELL CHEYETTE & SHAWN PARISH, CALIFORNIA ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION
LAW § 25.02 (Garrett Lindsey ed., 2017) (explaining that “express coverage for antitrust claims is
generally not included in typical business third-party liability insurance policies”).
382
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968).
383
Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 387 (4th Cir. 1982).
384
U.S. CONST. art. VII.
385
FED. R. CIV. P. 26–45.
386
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
387
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535
n.31 (1983).
388
Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990); Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S.
104 (1986); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
389
Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199, 225 (1990); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 724 (1977).
390
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 552 (2007).
391
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
380
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trio of cases including a prominent long running antitrust case involving the
electronics industry.392
In several circumstances, the Supreme Court has restricted the substance
of antitrust rules for fear of overenforcement, almost always in the context
of a private treble damages case.393 At least one recent appellate case has
suggested that certain jurisdictional aspects of foreign commerce antitrust
litigation should be narrower in private treble damage actions than in
government enforcement actions.394
Requirements for certification of class actions have been tightened,395
and separate legislation has made it easier for defendants to remove class
actions from more plaintiff friendly state courts.396 Class actions have been
eliminated in many instances through the enforcement of arbitration clauses
requiring only individual claims between the parties.397
Despite these retrenchments, the uniquely U.S. system for private
competition law enforcement has been labeled a “toxic cocktail” by
international commentators.398 No country would dream of adopting the full
panoply of U.S. civil litigation rights and duties in the antitrust area or more
generally. Even where private competition law litigation exists, it appears
very different from its U.S. equivalent. No major jurisdiction has adopted
treble damages. Most employ a strict loser pays principle. None have the
392
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 319 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S.
242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577 (1986).
393
Stephen Calkins, Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, With Special Attention to
Summary Judgment and Motions to Dismiss, in PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: NEW EVIDENCE, NEW
LEARNING ch. 5 (Lawrence J. White ed., 1988); Stephen Calkins, Reflections on Matsushita and
“Equilibrating Tendencies”: Lessons for Competition Authorities, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 15, 16 (2018).
394
Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816, 826 (7th Cir. 2015).
395
See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 38 (2013) (holding the class of subscribers was
improperly certified since the subscribers failed to show that common issues of damages predominated
in the action as required by F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3)); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338,
356 (2011) (holding that an employees’ class could not be certified because it failed the commonality
requirement under F.R.C.P. 23(a)(2)).
396
See Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-39)
(“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which:
(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant; (B) any
member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant
is a citizen of a State; or (C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant
is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.”).
397
See Am. Express v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2013) (holding that the FAA did
not permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitration on the ground that a plaintiff’s
cost of individuality arbitrating a federal statutory claim exceeded potential recovery); see also AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act
preempted California’s Discover Bank Rule); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S.
662, 663 (2010) (holding that an arbitration panel exceeded its powers by concluding that an arbitration
clause in the parties’ charter was silent with respect to class arbitration).
398
BARRY RODGER & ANGUS MACCULLOCH, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE EU AND UK
82 (5th ed. 2014).
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broad discovery system of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Some
restrict or bar contingent fees. Few have juries for civil litigation of any kind.
Most civil law systems rely on a system of judicial sovereignty with the
judge conducting the proceeding rather than the adversarial system of the
United States.
A wide variety of jurisdictions are developing private damage remedies
in competition law. The EU passed a directive requiring its member states
to create private rights of action which has recently been implemented by all
the member states.399 The EU further issued a recommendation on
“collective actions” designed to create an EU compatible version of class
action without the perceived excesses of the U.S. system.400 Private rights of
action, either standing alone or following government action, also exist to
varying degrees in jurisdictions as diverse as Australia, Canada, Israel,
China, Chile, Mexico, and many other jurisdictions.401 However, many of
these private litigation systems exist on paper only or remain in their infancy.
While the trends for private damage litigation and for class actions
between the United States and the rest of the world may be slowly
converging, the chance for a meeting somewhere in the middle remains
highly unlikely, or at best decades away. For the foreseeable future, the U.S.
system will remain defined by heavy reliance on private treble damages
competition litigation. The rest of the world will remain heavily dependent
on public administrative enforcement with private litigation struggling to
supplement the primacy of public administrative competition authorities.
V. FRONTIER ISSUES
Big data, algorithmic competition, social media, and related high
technology issues represent some of the frontier issues of competition
policy.402 A number of competition agencies have begun to marshal
399

Council Directive 2014/104, 2014 O.J. (L 349) 1 (EC), http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/104/oj
(“This Directive sets out certain rules necessary to ensure that anyone who has suffered harm caused by
an infringement of competition law by an undertaking or by an association of undertakings can
effectively exercise the right to claim full compensation for that harm from that undertaking or
association. It sets out rules fostering undistorted competition in the internal market and removing
obstacles to its proper functioning, by ensuring equivalent protection throughout the Union for anyone
who has suffered such harm.”).
400
Commission Recommendation 2013/396, 2013 O.J. (L 201) 60, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:JOL_2013_201_R_NS0013 (issuing a recommendation on collective actions).
401
For a discussion of these varying degrees of private rights of actions across jurisdictions, see
GLOBAL ANTITRUST COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK (D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2014), ABA SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, COMPETITION LAWS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 2010), and THE HANDBOOK
ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW (Albert A. Foer & Jonathan W. Cuneo eds., 2010).
402
ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF
THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (2016); MICHAL GAL, ORG. FOR ECON. COMPETITION & DEV., BIG
DATA: BRINGING COMPETITION POLICY TO THE DIGITAL ERA 14 (2016); MAURICE STUCKE & ALLEN
GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY (2016).
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resources to address these issues and formulate comprehensive responses to
mergers and potential abuse of dominance by digital platforms with likely
market power or dominance in different aspects of social networking,
internet retailing, internet search, and behavioral advertising.
Like the prior generation’s investigations and litigation against
Microsoft for its dominance of operating systems and application software,
the United States tentative enforcement and remedies have been
substantially exceeded by the EU, its member states, and certain other
jurisdictions.
The most innovative enforcement effort to date is the German
Bundeskartellampt’s preliminary decision against Facebook finding that the
company has abused its dominant position in social media by degrading the
privacy protections that it promised its users.403 This decision was recently
reversed by the Higher Regional Court with the German Cartel Office
vowing to appeal to the Federal Court of Justice leaving final resolution of
the case and the link between privacy and competition unresolved for the
near future. Although not part of the German case, the recent revelations of
the Facebook data breach involving Cambridge Analytica’s acquisition of
personal information of at least eighty-seven million users further highlight
the importance of the allegations in the German case.404
Apple’s planned acquisition of the song recognition software company
Shazam also raises important links between data privacy and competition in
the EU, which are not yet known to be part of any U.S. merger analysis of
the transaction.405 The EU announced opening a more detailed second phase
investigation of the Shazam transaction on the grounds that the transaction
may allow Facebook to acquire data on users’ relationships with competing
digital platforms and allow Facebook to adversely affect the competitive
opportunities of those rivals.406
403
See Bunderskartellamt Prohibits Facebook from Combining User Data from Different Sources,
BUNDERSKARTELLAMT
(July
2,
2019),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_2019_Fac
ebook.html (“If consent is not given for data from Facebook-owned services and third party websites,
Facebook will have to substantially restrict its collection and combining of data. Facebook is to develop
proposals for solutions to this effect.”).
404
See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as Fallout
Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebookcambridge-analytica-explained.html (“Cambridge Analytica, a political data firm hired by President
Trump’s 2016 election campaign, gained access to private information on more than 50 million Facebook
users. The firm offered tools that could identify the personalities of American voters and influence their
behavior.”).
405
See Sissi Cao, Why Tech’s ‘Big 4’ All Faced Antitrust Probes in Europe, But Not in the U.S.,
N.Y. OBSERVER (Feb. 15, 2018), https://observer.com/2018/02/eu-antitrust-probe-apple-amazonfacebook-google/ (“Apple is currently under an investigation by the European Commission (EC), the
EU’s law enforcement agency, on its planned acquisition of the U.K.-based song recognition company
Shazam.”).
406
See Ivana Kottasová, EU Hits Pause on Apple’s Deal to Buy Shazam, CNN (Apr. 23, 2018),
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The EU’s abuse of dominance case against Google is probably the most
significant case outside the United States. After a lengthy investigation and
numerous unsuccessful attempts to reach a settlement, the European
Commission reached a decision holding that Google had unlawfully abused
its dominance in the internet search market by demoting the search rankings
of competing vertical competitors. The Commission fined Google the
equivalent of more than 2.7 billion dollars and ordered Google to provide
non-discriminatory placement in search results to competitors going
forward.407 While Google appeals this decision, the Commission issued a
new decision imposing a fine of more than five billion dollars in connection
with Google’s licensing conditions for the Android mobile operating
system.408
The EU is taking the issue of digital economy quite seriously and
undertaking a series of comprehensive studies and measures unlike anything
occurring in the United States. It began with a General Directive on Data
Privacy which went into effect in May 2018.409 The European Commission
also has created plans and a framework for a single digital market for the EU
as a whole.410 Additionally, the Commission has begun an investigation of
Amazon’s dual role as merchant and platform operator.411
The Competition Directorate of the Commission has followed up on
these developments and created a Digital Advisory Panel to focus on the

https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/23/technology/apple-shazam-eu-antitrust-investigation/index.html,
(“The European Commission has launched an in-depth investigation into Apple’s acquisition of music
recognition app Shazam, delaying one of the tech company’s biggest deals by at least four months.”).
407
See European Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google
€4.34 Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of
Google’s Search Engine (July 18, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm (“The
European Commission has fined Google €4.34 billion for breaching EU antitrust rules. Since 2011,
Google has imposed illegal restrictions on Android device manufacturers and mobile network operators
to cement its dominant position in general internet search.”).
408
See Foo Yun Chee, EU Antitrust Chief Says Investigation of Google’s Android, AdSense is
Advancing, REUTERS (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-google-antitrust/euantitrust-chief-says-investigation-of-googles-android-adsense-is-advancing-idUSKBN1HP2YL
(“A
2016 document seen by Reuters said the EU competition enforcer planned to levy a large fine against the
company and would order it to stop giving revenue-sharing payments to smartphone makers to pre-install
only Google Search.”).
409
See Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119/1) (taking effect May 25, 2018).
410
Commission Staff Working Document on the Free Flow of Data and Emerging Issues of the
European Data Economy, EUR. COMM’N (Oct. 1, 2017), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-singlemarket/en/news/staff-working-document-free-flow-data-and-emerging-issues-european-data-economy.
411
See European Commission Press Release IP/19/4291, Antitrust: Commission Opens
Investigation Into Possible Anti-competitive Conduct of Amazon, (July 16, 2019),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_4291 (“The European Commission has
opened a formal antitrust investigation to assess whether Amazon’s use of sensitive data from
independent retailers who sell on its marketplace is in breach of EU competition rules.”).
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challenges of digitization for competition policy. The UK Competition
and Markets Authority announced that it will have a specialist data unit
following the recommendation of the blue ribbon expert panel known as the
Furman Report.413 The French Autorité de la concurrence and the German
Bundeskartellamt also have launched a joint project on algorithms and
competition law.414
Other jurisdictions and organizations are starting to think systematically
about the unique challenges to competition law posed by digitization, the
growth of big data, and other aspects of the internet. The OECD has
conducted several workshops on these issues.415 The French competition

412

EU: Vestager creates Digital Markets Advisory panel, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (Apr. 3,
2018), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/eu-vestager-creates-digital-markets-advisorypanel/.
413
See Unlocking Digital Competition, DIGITAL COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL (Mar. 2019),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/7855
47/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf (“This is why the Panel is recommending
the establishment of a digital markets unit, given a remit to use tools and frameworks that will support
greater competition and consumer choice in digital markets, and backed by new powers in legislation to
ensure they are effective.”); see also Tom Madge-Wyld, New CMA Data Unit Expected This Summer,
GLOBAL
COMPETITION
REV.
(Feb.
23,
2018),
https://globalcompetitionreview.com/article/1164238/new-cma-data-unit-expected-this-summer (“The
new data unit at the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority should be up and running by the summer,
the agency’s chief executive has said, which will beef up enforcement on digital tools and algorithms.”).
414
The French Autorité de la concurrence and the German Bundeskartellampt Launch a Joint
Project on Algorithms and Their Implications on Competition, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (June 19, 2018),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/19_06_2018_Alg
orithmen.html.
415
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD REVIEWS OF DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION:
GOING DIGITAL IN SWEDEN 3 (2018), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecdreviews-of-digital-transformation-going-digital-in-sweden_9789264302259-en#page1 (examining the
recent developments in infrastructures for the digital economy, telecom markets, and related regulations
and policies in Sweden); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION
OF
THE
HEARING
ON
BIG
DATA
2
(2016),
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/M(2016)2/ANN2/FINAL/en/pdf (“The Hearing on Big
Data aimed at identifying some of the competition challenges from the increasing use of consumer data
for business purposes, and to discuss possible reactions by competition authorities and other agencies.
The chairman opened the roundtable by introducing the panellists and organised the session in three
parts: a first part on the impact of Big Data on innovation and market power; a second part about the
implications of big data for competition law enforcement; and a short third part about whether other
regulations should be applied or even substitute the role of competition policy.”); Workshop on
Regulation and Competition in Light of Digitalization, OECD (Jan. 31, 2018),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/workshop-on-competition-regulation-and-digitalisation.htm
(“The
OECD organised a one-day workshop for competition official on 31 January 2018 in Paris to provide
insights into how common restrictions, arising in the context of digitalisation, are identified and analysed
by competition authorities and other agencies.”).
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agency has completed a market study of online advertising. The EU,417
the Canadian Competition Bureau,418 South Africa,419 the German
Bundeskartellamt, on its own, and in conjunction with the French
Competition Authority,420 and the Japanese Fair Trade Commission421 all
have issued statements or reports outlining their approaches to “big data” as
competition agencies. The UK has the Furman Report.422 The French and
German competition agencies have announced a joint project on how to
classify and analyze algorithms.423 The Australian competition agency has
announced a Digital Platform Inquiry.424 Most recent, the UK announced the
416
See Charlotte Breuvart, Eric Barbier de la Serre & Laurent De Muyter, French Competition
Authority Concludes Online Advertising Sector Inquiry and Announces Possible Further Actions,
KLUWER
COMPETITION
L.
BLOG
(Mar.
16,
2018),
http://competitionlawblog.kluwercompetitionlaw.com/2018/03/16/french-competition-authorityconcludes-online-advertising-sector-inquiry-announces-possible-actions/ (“In May 2016, the FCA and
the German Bundeskartellamt published a joint report on Big Data and its implications for competition
law. While the Bundeskartellamt followed up the report with investigations in the social media sector,
the FCA initiated a sector-specific inquiry focused on display online advertising, which complemented
its earlier 2010 report on search advertising.”).
417
Commission Decision No. 2018/1927, 2018 O.J. (L 313) 39 (EU), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018D1927&qid=1568181960167&from=E
N.
418
Big Data and Innovation: Key Themes for Competition Police in Canada, COMPETITION
BUREAU CAN. (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/CBReport-BigData-Eng.pdf/$file/CB-Report-BigData-Eng.pdf. The Bank of Canada has also weighed in on
this issue. Blake Cassels & Graydon LLP, Canadian Competition Policy Focuses in on “Big Data”,
LEXOLOGY (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=140bcc47-fd72-44f2ba18-e6ac7647785f.
419
COMPETITION COMM’N S. AFR., DATA SERVICES MARKET INQUIRY: SUMMARY OF
PROVISIONAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2019), http://www.compcom.co.za/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/Data-Services-Inquiry-Summary.pdf.
420
New Series of Bundeskartellamt Papers on “Competition and Consumer Protection in the
Digital
Economy”,
BUNDESKARTELLAMT
(Oct.
6,
2017),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2017/06_10_2017_Sch
riftenreihe%20Digitales.html; The French Autorité de la Concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt
Publish Joint Paper on Data and its Implications for Competition Law, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (May 10,
2016),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/10_05_2016_Big
%20Data%20Papier.html.
421
Press Release, Japan Fair Trade Comm’n, Report of Study Group on Data and Competition
Policy (June 6, 2017), https://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2017/June/170606.html.
422
Unlocking Digital Competition, supra note 413 (introductory letter from panel chair Jason
Furman).
423
The French Autorité de la Concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt Launch a Joint
Project on Algorithms and their Implications on Competition, BUNDESKARTELLAMT (June 19, 2018),
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2018/19_06_2018_Alg
orithmen.html.
424
Rod Sims, Chairman, Australian Competition & Consumer Comm’n, Speech at the International
Institute of Communications – Telecommunications and Media Forum: Regulating for Competition:
Stepping up for Platforms & Stepping Back from Media? (July 3, 2018), transcript available at
https://www.accc.gov.au/speech/regulating-for-competition-stepping-up-for-platforms-stepping-backfrom-media.
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creation of an independent task force to examine competition in digital
markets.425
In contrast, the United States has shown caution in enforcement and lack
of interest in the big data field as a separate policy matter. Most mergers in
data driven markets have been approved without conditions.426 The FTC
chose not to bring an expansive case against Google for monopolization and
unfair methods of competition despite a staff recommendation to do so.427
Instead, the FTC settled limited charges through an unusual voluntary letter
agreement rather than a binding consent decree.428 There are no publicly
available plans for a revived or revised investigation by the FTC, and
currently it is a coalition of fifty States and territories which are
investigating Google.429
As of the fall of 2019, no significant U.S. federal cases are underway
involving the tech giants facing competition scrutiny in multiple
jurisdictions abroad. The head of the Antitrust Division signaled in 2018 that
his agency is unlikely to undertake such a case, stating that consumer choice
rather than antitrust enforcement should guide the evolution of digital
platforms.430
425
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426
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conditions were imposed on the Google/DoubleClick merger because there was no chance of competitive
harm). See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 402, at 69–104 (surveying unchallenged recent merger
investigation involving big data).
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Google’s Search Practices In the Matter of Google Inc. FTC File Number 111-0163 (Jan. 3, 2013),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-commission-regardinggoogles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf. See also Jamie Condliffe, Leaked 2012
Report Says FTC Staff Wished to Sue Google Over Result Skews, GIZMODO (Mar. 20, 2015),
https://gizmodo.com/new-leaked-report-describes-how-ftc-staff-wanted-to-sue-1692564840
(stating
that the FTC initially wanted to sue Google for “skewing” searches).
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Online Search (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/01/google-agreeschange-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc. An unrelated portion of the case was settled through a binding
consent decree involving the licensing of standard essential patents relating to cell phone technology that
Google acquired through a prior acquisition from Motorola. Id.
429
Associated Press, Google Faces Antitrust Investigation by 50 U.S. States and Territories,
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See David McLaughlin, Trump Antitrust Chief Says no Sign of Competitive Harm from Tech,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-28/trump-antitrustchief-says-no-sign-of-competitive-harm-from-tech (“Major online platforms have significant market
power, but the question for antitrust enforcers is whether or not they’re taking steps to stifle innovations
that challenge that dominance, . . . .”); Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice,
Keynote Address at the University of Chicago’s Antitrust and Competition Conference (Apr. 19, 2018),
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In the past year, the U.S. rhetoric has somewhat changed, but not the
enforcement record. The FTC has created a high tech taskforce to explore
future options.432 In addition, the U.S. enforcement agencies have agreed
that the Antitrust Division will conduct any resulting investigations of
Google and Apple, while the FTC will conduct any investigations of
Amazon and Facebook.433 Any enforcement actions would be in the medium
to long term and would be subject to the narrower U.S. vision of the abuse
of market power versus the more expansive EU toolkit in this area.
A simple recent illustration of this digital divide in antitrust enforcement
took place in separate interviews by the head of the Antitrust Division and
the Competition Directorate of the EU. Makan Delrahim gave an interview
to the Financial Times where he stated that the tech giants were a source of
“great efficiencies.”434 In contrast, Margethe Vestager of the EU stated that
if there’s no regulation, “you have just the laws of the jungle and not the
laws of democracy.”435
VI. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
The isolation of U.S. antitrust across many key substantive, procedural,
and institutional aspects affects our interactions with the rest of the
competition law community. This Section explores how we got here and its
normative implications.
A. History and Culture
Much of the growing and persistent isolation of U.S. antitrust is a
function of history and path dependence. Antitrust in the United States began
at the state level in the 1880s with the federal government following a decade
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-keynoteaddress-university-chicagos (explaining that the first “component” of antitrust is consumer welfare).
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Antitrust Probe, BLOOMBERG POL. (June 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0604/google-s-enemies-sharpen-complaints-as-doj-opens-antitrust-probe.
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436

later with the Sherman Act. The open-ended, broadly worded, almost
constitutional, language of the Sherman Act was a product of its times and
the U.S. common law system. While the United States has been influential
to varying degrees in the adoption of other jurisdictions’ competition
systems, the other systems all were adopted or modified into their modern
forms much later and in very different legal and societal climates.437 There
is no reason to think that copying the United States was the principal reason
for their outcome or evolution.438
There is every reason to believe that most competition systems around
the world have emulated the EU rather than the United States. Competition
law is part of the “acquis communautaire” that all member states are required
to incorporate into their own national law.439 All current member states have
national competition law that closely tracks the competition laws of the EU
and may not conflict with its core provisions.440 Special provisions also
allow member states to have broader laws regarding abuse of a dominant
position.441
Many of these competition provisions were explicitly adopted by
countries in order to facilitate eventual membership in the EU. Other
countries adopted EU style provisions out of necessity or choice in
connection with their membership in the EU or the European Free Trade
Agreement, or to secure preferential trade agreements with the EU.442 Still
others have colonial or cultural ties with EU countries that made EU style
competition law a more natural fit.
Even Japan and Germany, where the United States exerted more direct
influence following the end of World War II, quickly modified their original
436

15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
See Amedeo Arena, The Relationship Between Antitrust and Regulation in the US and the EU:
Can Legal Tradition Account for the Difference?, 3 CAMBRIDGE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 330, 354–56 (2014)
(comparing and contrasting antitrust in the United States and the EU).
438
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and applying on their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct engaged
in by undertakings.”).
442
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competition laws to fit their indigenous needs and diverged from whatever
U.S. roots from which they grew.443 If there is a competition for the hearts
and minds of the world’s one hundred thirty plus competition systems, the
EU has long since acquired a dominant position.
Two recent examples illustrate this type of divergence where very
different jurisdictions either adopted or modified their competition laws
ultimately adopting language and approaches developed for their national
needs more in line with EU competition principles. More than fifteen years
ago, China began a systematic study of world competition systems to
develop its first competition law as part of the promotion of its socialist
market economy. Scholars note that the PRC relied on key EU, and less so
U.S., concepts and sources in selecting the rules, procedures, and institutions
that best suited their needs.444
Chile also has modified its competition laws in recent years. The new
statutory language echoes that of Articles 101 and 102, even though key
concepts remain undefined by guidelines or precedent. For example, Article
3(a), amended in 2016, prohibits agreements or concerted practices that
involve competitors and consist of fixing sale or purchase prices, limit
production, allow them to assign market zones or quotas, or affect the result
of bidding processes, as well as agreements or concerted practices that
confer them market power, consist in determining marketing conditions, or
that exclude competitors.445 Article 3(b) incorporates the familiar EU notion
of abuse of dominance.446
The dominance of EU style competition policy seems unlikely to abate.
Similarly, it is difficult to see which jurisdiction has bucked, or is likely to
buck, that trend and adopt the narrow substantive, procedural, institutional,
and remedial U.S. approach as its playbook for competition policy.
B. Ideology
Some of the enduring and increasing isolation of United States antitrust
in the world community also is a function of ideology. As Professor Eleanor
Fox has noted:
In the matter of single-firm conduct, the U.S., especially as
recited in the Trinko case, is laissez faire; it makes
assumptions that the EU does not make. The default
presumptions are very powerful. For example: if you are
443
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acting as a single firm (not in conspiracy with competitors),
you’re probably going to do what’s best for the market if
government leaves you alone. That is because (the
assumptions go) markets work well and will punish you if you
try to harm competition.447
Taking the U.S. agencies and courts at their word, the sole or principal
objective of U.S. antitrust is the promotion of consumer welfare defined in
a narrow price theory fashion.448 While many commentators dispute whether
this is true historically or desirable normatively, this is the gospel that the
U.S. agencies preach in their dealings with other jurisdictions.
The United States has pursued a policy of promoting its view of best
practices to other jurisdictions in a variety of fora. First, the United States
worked to oppose the inclusion of competition rules in the WTO
negotiations because of concern that binding rules would be adopted that
differed from U.S. practice and interests.449 Instead, the United States
promoted the creation of the International Competition Network (ICN), a
virtual organization that would be voluntary, consensus driven, and focused
on development of best practices.450 The United States has worked through
both government agency personnel and non-governmental advisers to
promote its view of best practices to varying degrees of success since the
creation of the ICN over both Republican and Democratic administrations.
From this perspective, the ICN report card is mixed. As noted
throughout this Paper, the ICN often has documented the diversity of
competition law practice rather than promote the substantive convergence
of competition hoped for by U.S. interests. The ICN has been very valuable
as a teaching tool and as a forum for the sharing of information and practice
among diverse jurisdictions, but it has not resulted in most jurisdictions
becoming a mirror for the United States. More often than not, other
jurisdictions enforce their own competition laws knowledgeably and
effectively but do not do so by adopting the existing U.S. approach.
A similar pattern exists in the other U.S. interactions in international
organizations, regional trade arrangements, and bilateral relationships in the
competition sphere. This is the case at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), where most of the members follow the
EU, rather than the U.S., model for competition matters.451 It is true at the
447
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which
is dedicated to the interests of smaller and developing jurisdictions.452 It is
similarly the case at The World Bank which views competition law as part
of a developmental agenda.453
A cursory review of the work product of important organizations such
as the ICN and the OECD shows the diversity of opinion on a plethora of
key competition issues. Two surveys help illustrate the extent of the
divergence. The first survey relates to the goals of competition law itself.
That survey notes that a majority of the respondents identified the promotion
of consumer welfare as only one of several goals for competition law.454
A second ICN survey on unilateral conduct provisions similarly shows
the wide gulf between U.S. practice and the rest of the world. The survey
begins with a list of ten different goals for single firm conduct provisions
which include:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

Ensuring an effective competitive process;
Promoting consumer welfare;
Maximizing efficiency;
Ensuring economic freedom;
Ensuring a level playing field for small and medium
size enterprises;
Promoting fairness and equality;
Promoting consumer choice;
Achieving market integration;
Facilitating privatization and market liberalization;
and
Promoting
competitiveness
in
international
markets.455

Not all of the isolation of U.S. antitrust is related to the rejection of
economic analysis, or the preferencing of other normative values such as the
452
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single market imperative, ordoliberalism, promotion of democratic values,
or notions of industrial policy embedded within competition law systems.
Even within the economic community, U.S. economists tend to be more
favorable to economic ideas based on free trade and market competition than
their British, French, or German peers.456 The same appears to true for U.S.
society as a whole in comparison to its EU counterparts.457
Most of the discourse in these fora is civil and sophisticated. Countries
have learned much from each other as to best practices and achieved limited
harmonization in certain areas.458 More often than not, the United States
remains a seller, rather than a buyer, and frequently comes home empty
handed.
Other times, U.S. frustration with other jurisdictions’ conduct bubbles
over both in public and private. These incidents have arisen in both
Republican and Democratic administrations and generally fall in one of
three camps. The foreign enforcer (often the EU) often is criticized for not
applying sound economics; protecting competitors, and not competition;
taking action when the U.S. agencies have refrained or limited their actions;
or applying competition law in a discriminatory manner against a U.S.
respondent.459
The main source of antitrust enforcement strife between the United
States and the European Union during the Clinton Administration came with
the difference in opinion regarding the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas merger.
This merger was cleared in the United States largely on the grounds that the
merger would not likely cause a substantial lessening of competition because
of the weakening over time of McDonnell-Douglas’s market position.460 The
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transatlantic controversy began when the EU threatened to block the merger
entirely and ultimately imposed substantial conditions on its approval.461
President Clinton expressed his concerns about the European
Commission’s reasons for opposing the merger and noted that it would be
“unfortunate” if the United States entered into a trade standoff with the
EC.462 Clinton also speculated about going to the World Trade Organization
or sanctioning European countries if the European Commission continued
opposing the merger.463
President Clinton also noted that the EU appeared to be making a
political decision to protect Airbus. Clinton stated, “the Europeans have
more people living on their continent than we do in the United States, and I
don’t believe Airbus has an effective competitor in Europe.”464 Top
administration officials, including United States Trade Representative
Charlene Barshefsky and Commerce Secretary William Daley, hinted at
U.S. retaliation if the EU continued to oppose the merger.465
The first major antitrust enforcement disagreement between the United
States and the EU occurred during the Bush Administration over the
proposed merger between GE and Honeywell. This was the first time that
foreign regulators fully blocked a proposed merger between two U.S.
companies. President George W. Bush noted that he wanted U.S. companies
to be treated fairly in Europe and that he was concerned that the European
Commission was making their decisions in an effort to appease Airbus.466
President Bush also questioned the European Commission’s demand that
GE sell off several of its aircraft engineering units after the Canadian and
U.S. regulators had already approved the deal.467
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After the EU announced its decision, Treasury Secretary Paul H. O’Neill
fervently criticized the outcome as “off the wall.”468 Senators John D.
Rockefeller and Ernest F. Hollings “warned that thwarting the merger would
damage transatlantic relations and compel retaliatory action by
Washington.”469
President Bush’s Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Charles A.
James, voiced his criticism of the EU’s GE/Honeywell decision in a series
of speeches.470 Immediately after the decision, James stated that “[c]lear and
longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that the antitrust laws protect
competition, not competitors,” and that this EU decision represented a
“significant point of divergence.”471 On September 21, 2001, James made
another speech in which he criticized the so-called “portfolio effects”
analysis employed by the EU as “antithetical to the goals of antitrust law
enforcement.”472 Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust
Division William Kolasky reiterated those views in a November 2001
speech.473 Kolasky again criticized the “portfolio effects” approach of the
EU and also chastised it for focusing on the mixed bundling theory as a
means of coming to its decision.474
The Bush Administration also criticized the EU and Korean Microsoft
decisions. Shortly after the EU’s imposition of sanctions, Senate Majority
Leader Bill Frist condemned the Commission’s action. Claiming that
Europe’s economies were stagnant because of huge debt, taxes, and
crippling business regulation in Brussels, Mr. Frist stated that the “European
Commission has taken aim at Microsoft, a company whose products and
technology have been engines of global economic growth.”475
468
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R. Hewitt Pate, then head of the Antitrust Division, said the
Commission’s demand that a Windows version be offered without the media
player went too far and expressed concerns that “imposing code removal
remedies” could potentially produce unintended consequences down the
road. He also reiterated Charles James’s argument from the GE/Honeywell
case by mentioning that “sound antitrust policy must avoid chilling
innovation and competition even by dominant companies.”476
President Obama was equally critical of the European Commission’s
investigation of Google’s alleged policy of “favoring its search results over
those of competitors.”477 His primary criticism of the European Union’s
decision was that the EU was motivated in this decision by the commercial
interests of its tech companies who struggle to compete with larger
American rivals, such as Google.478 He claimed that the EU was “hiding
protectionism behind a veil of principle” and suggested that the true blame
in this difference in policy lies within protectionist European firms and
governments because they cannot possibly compete fairly against the United
States.479
The Ireland/Apple state aid deal dispute arose at the end of the Obama
Administration and continues to play a role in the Trump Administration’s
policy decisions. The United States Treasury Department said that this
punishment jeopardized “the important spirit of economic partnership
between the U.S. and the E.U.”480 Chuck Schumer called it a “cheap money
grab” by the European Commission that targeted U.S. businesses and the
U.S. tax base.481 The Trump Administration responded by unsuccessfully
seeking to intervene in Apple’s appeal of the Commission’s order.482 Other
recent EU state aid tax investigations include Amazon, McDonald’s,
Starbucks, and Google and are bound to generate similar controversy.483
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Most recently, President Trump tweeted his displeasure at the EU’s five
billion dollar fine of Google in connection with its Android licensing
practices.484 Undoubtedly, more tweets and more traditional and diplomatic
criticisms will unfold as Google and other U.S. corporations continue to
draw enforcement actions and penalties for conduct that the United States
chooses not to challenge or treats more leniently.
C. Exclusion from the Conversation
There is a robust and ongoing conversation among governments and
non-governmental experts about competition law, policy, institutions,
remedies, and norms. That conversation takes place in international
organizations, bilateral consultations, cooperation between agencies on
individual enforcement matters, technical assistance with newer and smaller
competition agencies, bar associations, industry groups, universities, think
tanks, conferences, legal publications, and in legal, business, and general
interest publications.485
The United States is, and should be, part of that conversation. We have
a proud history and a record of great accomplishment. However, the rest of
the world is less subject to U.S. pressure and less interested in U.S.
recommendations that are rooted in the history and present policies of the
United States if these ideas do not meet the needs of the other jurisdictions.
At the same time, the rest of the world has an increasingly deep and
impressive track record of enforcement, as well as legal and policy
innovations of their own. If the antitrust community is going to continue to
have a productive dialogue and not a series of one-way speeches, then a
number of changes must occur. These changes include a recognition of
difference, a greater appreciation for listening, the need for two-way
learning, a recognition of the limits of deep harmonization, and a
fundamentally different role for the United States on the international stage.
1. Look Before You Leap
For decades, the United States has been a vigorous salesman for the
principles embodied in the Sherman Act.486 It is not clear how successful it
has been of late. It is also not clear why most jurisdictions should adopt a
particular position or practice of the United States in their own competition
law without great care and caution. The slow, complicated adoption of
criminal cartel enforcement in certain jurisdictions (and rejection in others)
illustrates the need to tailor concepts appropriate to one legal culture before
implementation in another setting.
484
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2. Avoid Bullying
There is a significant difference between not understanding how the
United States approaches a particular competition issue and fully
understanding what is being advocated, but not agreeing with the proposal.
The knowledge and sophistication of enforcers, practitioners, and academics
around the world suggest that the latter is the case far more than the former.
As Oliver Wendell Holmes once observed: “[Y]ou can not argue a man into
liking a glass of beer.”487
The United States has made its case forcefully and often to the
international antitrust community. It should continue to do so when it
believes that the national interest so dictates. But decades into the
international antitrust game, the world is now pretty much divided into those
who like the U.S. beer and those who do not.
There is a different model that derives from the field of community
organizing of social work. In past decades, well-meaning community
organizers were often the voice of oppressed or powerless communities,
teaching them what they needed and how to get it. In more recent times, a
newer model has emerged where the goal is not to be the voice for another
community but to support them in finding their voice and be an ally as they
advocate on their own behalf.488
3. Learn to Listen
Perhaps it is time for the United States in the international antitrust arena
to “talk less, smile more.”489 Building on the analogy from the world of
community organizing, we are at, or rapidly arriving at, the point in global
antitrust discourse where the United States should advocate less for what it
wants and listen more to the hopes and needs of other jurisdictions and how
to help them achieve their own goals.
There is still an important role for the United States (and other developed
jurisdictions) to play in providing technical assistance and other forms of
training to the smaller, newer, and poorer antitrust jurisdictions around the
487
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world. These jurisdictions seek to enforce their laws often with minimal
resources and experience. Bilateral, regional, and international fora can be a
vital tool for workshops on how to do the work of competition enforcement
better. But better often means actively listening to determine the needs of
beneficiaries and helping them find their voice, not echoing the voice of
another.
4. Listen to Learn
It may also be time for the United States to consider being a buyer, rather
than seller, in the arena of antitrust policy. It has been decades since the
United States was the world’s policeman for antitrust. For better or worse,
that honor now goes to the EU for the foreseeable future if the hands-off
attitude of the United States toward the issue of single firm conduct
continues.
Is there really nothing the United States can learn from the more than
sixty years of EU competition law, or the nearly thirty years since the
flowering of global antitrust regimes in the wake of the fall of the Soviet
Union? One starting point may be the value of applying competition law to
restraints in the public sector or involving firms receiving special privileges
from the state. Anticompetitive state and local restrictions may be less of an
issue in the United States compared to countries with a history of socialism
or state-planned economies, but it is not a negligible problem. It is also one
which unusually tends to unite antitrust conservatives and liberals as an issue
worth tackling.
It would probably take congressional action to overturn the antitrust
state action doctrine as enunciated by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown
and its progeny.490 There also is uncharted territory involving the
interpretation of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as
another possible source of state authority to impede competition.491
The FTC has begun down this path without expressly relying on the
many sources of comparative competition law to support its efforts to narrow
the state action doctrine. It has brought selected antitrust enforcement
actions which have resulted in the Supreme Court raising the bar for
successful invocation of state action immunity.492 At the same time, it has
also resulted in certain state legislatures more explicitly mandating the
anticompetitive results and processes to satisfy the new Supreme Court
standards, making it hard to determine the net results in the real world.493
490
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For the past several years, the FTC has also begun an “economic liberty”
project as a competition advocate for the removal of state and local restraints
on competition that harm consumers even if protected by the state action
doctrine as currently understood.494
Perhaps it is time to use the collective experience of the rest of the world
as an additional argument for the benefits of this approach. The United States
is not the only federal system in the world to confront the issue of the limits
of the authority of constituent states or provinces. The United States has
never highly valued comparative law in the competition sphere, or in
general. Perhaps now is the time to employ this new type of learning and
argumentation in both its litigation and advocacy strategies to diminish harm
to competition from an entire sector of the economy only partially subject to
the normal rules of the competitive market.
Even if the U.S. agencies are not receptive to the explicit reference to
comparative competition norms, the courts may be another fertile arena for
learning from international practice. It is highly unusual for any U.S. court
or agency to cite foreign law or practice in the antitrust field except as
background information to deciding an issue on purely U.S. grounds.495 This
was once a necessity as the United States was nearly alone in having a
mature body of antitrust learning and precedent. It is no longer the case. The
divergence and diversity of doctrine and practice set forth in this Article
provide many fertile avenues for consideration in improving our own laws,
procedures, institutions, and remedies. Learning and best practices should
be a two-way street and a true form of regulatory humility in moving toward
best practices based on a body of global experience where the United States
is often the outlier.
5. Be Aware of New Rhetorical Strategies
Rhetoric, discourse, and language are important tools to channel
conversation, close off paths for discussions, categorize contending points
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of view as beyond the pale, and define the shape of disciplines. They can
be both tools of reaction and revolution.497
United States officials and commentators are employing a variety of
relatively new rhetorical strategies in response to new movements in U.S.
antitrust and the continuing developments on the international and global
front. Many of these strategies seem innocuous or even self-evident. Many
of these suggestions even contain important kernels of truth.
At the same time, most of these strategies represent an attempt to
maintain the primacy of a normative and theoretical position about how to
operate the antitrust enterprise and an attempt to justify the relative inaction
of the United States in enforcing types of causes of action that are
commonplace in other jurisdictions. It will be interesting to follow how the
continuing international dialogue between the United States and the rest of
the world embraces or rejects some of the rhetorical justifications of the U.S.
status quo.
i.

Hipster Antitrust

Figures from former U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch to former FTC
Commissioner Joshua Wright have derided hipster antitrust as anything that
argues against increased economic concentration and its effects on
employment, wages, technological progress, abuse of power, and other
societal ills.498 It is not clear exactly what hipster antitrust is or whether it is
a bad thing. In general, a hipster can be defined “as a person who follows
the latest trends and fashions, especially those regarded as being outside the
cultural mainstream.”499
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Hipster can also mean artisanal, custom, uniquely created products and
services for discerning customers. That suggests the antitrust enterprise is
not one size fits all and should be crafted with the needs of the customer in
mind, rather than the purveyor.
This intended epithet is invoked primarily to denigrate anything and
anyone that criticizes the wealth maximization paradigm favored by Robert
Bork and his disciples.500 More polite discourse on these topics tends to
characterize critics of Borkian antitrust as neo-Brandeisians, but still
dismisses such concerns as either unworkable in practice or beyond the
proper boundaries of antitrust.501 Either way, dismissing fundamental
critiques of one view of the work of antitrust, primarily associated with the
United States, misses the current state of the world, which approaches
competition law and policy with a broader palate of tools and approaches.
ii.

Evidence-Based Antitrust

A somewhat similar group of commentators argues in favor of evidencebased antitrust.502 At the most banal level, it is hard to argue with the need
500
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for evidence that supports the allegations underlying an investigation or
decision. But when one drills down below the surface, this rhetorical ploy is
another way of preferring inaction to action. Such a view favors avoiding
type I errors versus type II errors, assumes markets will self-correct quickly,
and promotes the view that any form of enforcement risks making things
worse rather than better.503
Scratch a little deeper and the ideological roots of these arguments
become more apparent. For some critics, there is simply never enough
evidence to support a past, present, or future enforcement action. For others,
a strong commitment to Borkian antitrust theory results in the preferencing
of one type of evidence over others, or the dismissal of record evidence of
competitive harm when not in line with a theoretical commitment. The
rhetoric of evidence-based antitrust masks a set of positions and arguments
that may or may not represent the present or future of U.S. antitrust. It is
aimed primarily at domestic consumption and ill-suited for other
jurisdictions with a very different past and present for competition law and
policy.
iii.

Regulatory Humility

Former FTC chair Maureen Olhausen, among others, has argued for
“regulatory humility” as a guide star for competition policy.504 Again, on the
surface, this seems both sensible and innocuous. No one wants a bureaucrat
or agency with an enormous ego acting out with a vengeance. However,
scratching even the surface of such rhetoric reveals a similar policy
preference for inaction, lack of regulation, reliance on markets, and various
policy positions that are laissez faire in nature, but largely unrelated to
humility in any normal sense of the word. It is not a humility born out of a
need to faithfully execute a mission set by the legislature. It is not a humility
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born out of a desire to respect precedent. It is not a humility born out of a
need to match policy preferences to the evidence in a case.
Humility by agencies or courts is thus orthogonal to the policy
preferences of whether to open an investigation, initiate a proceeding, or
reach a decision. It is not a sign of humility to reverse (or continue) the
policies of a prior administration; it is a sign of belief in the correctness of
one’s position on the merits of the issue. It is hardly convincing to similarly
situated enforcers outside of the body politic, who view enforcement of the
law as set forth in their system as their humble duty.
iv.

Due Process and Procedural Fairness

The most sympathetic arguments of the new rhetoric of U.S. antitrust is
the need for greater due process and procedural fairness.505 Due process is a
hallmark of procedural democracy enshrined in the constitutions, treaties,
regulations, and administrative laws of most jurisdictions. Enforcement,
inaction, or a decision based on corruption, favoritism, or discrimination is
an anathema to justice. By themselves, calls for greater transparency and due
process are hard to argue with in the abstract. The ICN has adopted twelve
general principles for procedural fairness in antitrust matters.506 At the same
time, the United States is leading the charge to negotiate a broader and more
precise global framework covering most of the world’s competition
jurisdictions.507
Concerns remain that these talks are aimed at strengthening the hand of
the U.S. government when U.S. firms are subject to foreign proceedings.508
It will be interesting to observe how these tools will be used when there are
decisions against U.S. firms as either plaintiffs or defendants in mature
democratic foreign regimes and when U.S. agencies and courts render
antitrust decisions affecting foreign firms as either plaintiffs or defendants.
The line between procedure and substance often can be hard to discern.
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CONCLUSION
This has been an article about difference rather than the wisdom of the
choices made. Competition law outside the United States is well developed,
but very different in many respects. Competition law as a field is defined by
a common set of concerns at the highest level of generalities that agreements
between undertakings (particularly cartels) pose a risk of harming
competition, that the behavior of dominant firms can be a concern, and that
certain mergers and acquisitions can harm competition. Scratch below that
surface and a growing series of divergences quickly appears. Many do not
affect how a particular case comes out in a particular jurisdiction or how
jurisdictions can profitably cooperate with each other without contention to
do their jobs better.
Regardless of what goals or outcomes one favors for antitrust law and
policy in the United States, this Article argues that the U.S. system is
fundamentally different from its international counterparts. In some ways,
those differences are as stark as the day and night worlds of The Omega
Man’s world, even if they are less dramatic.
In a fundamental way, we are dealing with two different worldviews
about the realities of a global economy. For better or worse, the U.S. system
is litigation driven before juries and generalist judges. It is heavily invested
in criminal enforcement and contains multiple centers of federal, state, and
private enforcement. The U.S. system is more concerned about
overenforcement rather than underenforcement and operates with a far
smaller toolkit than many of its global counterparts. Outside the United
States, competition law more often has a broader vision and toolkit for what
is deemed within the purview of competition policy. International
competition law is increasingly focused on scrutinizing tech giants and is
centered in unitary competition agencies. It is administrative in nature, with
large fines as the principal enforcement tool, and is less bound up in the
rhetoric of overenforcement. It is subject to deferential judicial review and
has only embryonic private enforcement.
These two ways of looking at the world of competition law and policy
largely co-exist, but occasionally conflict. The dream of deep substantive
harmonization appears to be receding, rather than advancing, despite the
commendable work of organizations like the International Competition
Network, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. But the
enduring differences go beyond substantive doctrine and include procedure,
institutions, remedies, ideologies, and the very boundaries of the purview of
antitrust and competition.
History, culture, ideology, and even inertia suggest that these are two
fundamentally different ways of approaching an important issue of
international economic law that is unlikely to change anytime soon. There
may not be many active day-to-day conflicts between such differing views,
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but there will be conflicting burdens on private parties, increased costs of
navigating different systems, and specific disagreements that generate much
heat and light.
It is fair to discuss and debate whether a given law, procedure,
institution, or remedy can be improved, but there are no universal solutions
for all but the most mundane issues. The United States is not as isolated as
Robert Neville in The Omega Man, but it is still an outlier. Whether in terms
of population or GDP, the vast majority of the rest of the world has
competition law. It just isn’t ours. We may be an early adopter of
competition law, but we are not alone. We are legend.

